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 Prohibition opened the door to the United States for individuals or groups to smuggle 
alcohol by waterways. These people came from all walks of life and were known as rumrunners. 
The United States Coast Guard was charged with upholding the law and preventing any alcohol 
from reaching the American shore. This brought the two groups into constant conflict with each 
other. Each side continually modified their technology in accordance to their needs and 
associated economic factors in efforts to gain the upper hand. These maritime innovations caused 
an escalation in innovations between the two opposing forces, resulting in a rapid advancement 
of maritime technology that would not likely have been attained during normal times of trade. 
Designers and builders implemented the most successful of these innovations into later vessels. 
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 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Prohibition of alcohol during the 1920s and the early part of the 1930s in the United 
States essentially placed the country at war with itself. Major governmental efforts were made 
from the coast of California all the way to the Great Lakes to stop the sale and manufacture of 
liquor in America (Ensign 1997:1). The majority of these efforts ended peacefully while some 
ended in direct conflict and bloodshed. However, with a constant demand for liquor and the 
opportunity for profit, many individuals grew wealthy from delivering alcohol to clandestine 
markets within the United States through various methods (Garling 1992:103). With a 
developing mainland police that was concentrating its efforts on reducing the manufacture and 
transportation of liquor within America, many took to importing spirits from other countries via 
the water. These individuals, or rumrunners, were in constant opposition with the organization 
tasked with stopping them: the United States Coast Guard (Willoughby 1964:19). This conflict, 
known as the Rum War, spanned over a decade and resulted in a multitude of innovations in 
marine technology on both sides, with the rumrunners augmenting their watercraft to be more 
effective at eluding the Coast Guard while the latter organization struggled to increase the 
capabilities of their vessels in order to prevent liquor from reaching the mainland. The designers 
and engineers of watercraft types and associated technologies of all kinds, from vessels of war to 
everyday pleasure craft, eventually adopted the more effective innovations that were developed 
during this conflict. This thesis, therefore, seeks to ask: was marine innovation spurred by 
conflict and economic factors during the period of Prohibition in the United States?  
 The Prohibition Era in the United States allows research regarding this subject to take 
place within a microcosm that has very few factors outside of the geographical location of North 
America affecting the outcome of developing maritime technology. Both sides of this conflict
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began with very little in terms of equipment for carrying out their objectives; the rumrunners 
initially used whatever they had at hand while the Coast Guard was outfitted with craft that were 
large, steady, slow, and designed for saving lives, not for speed and maneuverability. As 
Prohibition wore on, financial limits were tossed aside on both sides, creating an arms race that 
resulted in technological innovation (Ensign 1997:8-13).  
Theory 
 Theories involving conflict and change are ideal for a study of the Prohibition Era in the 
United States. During this time America seemed to be in a constant state of internal conflict 
because of economic despair in the form of a recession, high unemployment numbers, and the 
constant protest against terrible working conditions (Morrison 2008:4). The American people did 
what they needed to survive even if that meant breaking laws at the local or federal level. These 
actions can be defined both as physical and ideological conflicts as many, including the 
rumrunners, exploited a capitalist system that had fallen on hard times in order to further their 
own means (Thornton 2007:73-77).  
One of the major theoretical viewpoints involving conflict comes from Marxism. Named 
for one of its founding developers, Karl Marx, Marxism focuses on class struggle. That class 
struggle “for Marx… will always be antagonism and conflict between these three elements: the 
forces of production, the state of society, and consciousness, can and must come into 
contradiction with one another…until they bring the whole structure crashing down, and a new 
social formation will rise on its ruins” (Johnson 2010:96). Since the inception of Marxist thought 
there have been many different schools striving to propel or build upon ideas within Marxist 
theory.  
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The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory that came about in the early 1900s is one such 
example of ideas based upon Marxist thought. Theorists within the realm of Critical Theory 
studied media and ways to break down ideology behind various societies’ methods of 
domination over their own citizens. Critical theorists decided that one of the ways to go about 
building their theory was to use Georg Hegel’s model of the dialectic (McGuire 2002:37). The 
dialectic within Critical Theory is defined as 
Georg Hegel’s philosophy of change through the resolution of opposites. In this the 
central tendency or thesis is opposed by its opposite or antithesis. When the tensions are 
resolved as a synthesis this in turn becomes the thesis(,) which generates a new antithesis 
and so on. Thus dialectics provides an interpretation of change(,) which emphasizes the 
clash of opposing influences or groups as the motor of social transformation (Darvill 
2002:121). 
 
This concept of the dialectic can be difficult to grasp due to preconceived notions ingrained in 
most societies that change and progress are linear and develop over time from groups with 
similar goals (McGuire 2002:91). However, this theory ties in perfectly when used to research 
the development of ships’ innovations and technical changes during America’s Era of 
Prohibition. This is because “the dialectic also offers us a method of studying change. It is a 
method that finds the dynamics of change in the contradictions that exist in all human relations, 
with each other, and with the natural world” (McGuire 2002:15).  
With this theory several factions represent the contradictions of various influences. The 
most obvious is the conflict between the United States Coast Guard and the rumrunners. Of 
lesser notice at first glance was the conflict between the rumrunners themselves. Trade of any 
valuable commodity creates market demand, especially materials labeled as contraband. Supply 
and demand can lead to competition between rivals that can result in technological innovation 
(Thornton 2007:82-83). An example of this is the technical developments made by shipyards to 
compete in terms of speed to deliver their product before the market became saturated during the 
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opium and slave trades of the mid-nineteenth century (Layton 1997:40-51, 109-110). Prohibition 
also provides examples of the notion of evolving competing technologies being resolved into 
synthesis. Many of the rum-running vessels that were captured by the Coast Guard were later 
used as coastal patrol vessels against those that participated in the illicit trade (Willoughby 
1964:147-148). Also, the technical knowledge gleaned from captured vessels helped to improve 
those of the Coast Guard.  
 The ideas and notions brought forth by Critical Theory and Hegel’s dialectic were 
conceived to discuss issues of major social change and therefore seem to have no initial place 
when discussing the developments of ships and their technology. This belief instead supports the 
development of ship based technology when examined with the knowledge that watercraft of all 
kinds are deeply ingrained within multiple segments of societies. Maritime archaeologist 
Jonathan Adams has rationalized that “As both vehicles and machines, ships represented an 
enormous investment in resources. Shipbuilding has, therefore, been a complex social activity 
involving organization, co-operation and investment in the long term. Through the economic, 
social, and political mechanisms of which they were part, ships have thus deeply pervaded 
society” (Adams 2001:300). Adams then goes on to say that when “one goes beyond functional 
and system analyses we might add ‘the ship as symbol,’ as ideology afloat and the expression of 
social ideas, including those of the tradition within which the craft is constructed…(and) can be 
viewed as a manifestation of the maritime needs and aspirations of (the) society (that created it)” 
(Adams 2001:300). Thus, it could be argued that by examining the technology and purpose of a 
ship that cultural insight could be gathered on the society that produced it. By studying the 
various innovations adopted by the watercraft used during America’s Prohibition Era, it is 
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possible to understand what the needs and aspirations were of the individuals or groups that 
created them and the means by which they were used. 
 Economics also plays a part in technological developments during periods of prohibition. 
However, “little progress has been made toward a theoretical understanding of prohibition” 
(Thornton 2007:71). This does not mean that other theories cannot be utilized to an 
understanding of the economics of prohibition. For purposes of simplicity, this thesis will view 
the United States’ free market economy in terms of the market-process approach that: 
…begins with the truism that human action is purposeful and aimed at enhancing 
individual utility amid uncertainty and imperfect knowledge. Economic development 
occurs through exchange, learning, entrepreneurship, innovation, and the evolution of 
institutions (Thornton 2007:77). 
 
All of this directs the products within the economy towards the concepts of price equilibrium. It 
also addresses the search for profit, which “results in a competition based not only on price but 
also on alterations of the product and the development of new products” (Thornton 2007:77-78). 
This market competition fits in with the aforementioned dialectic in that technology and methods 
will develop over a period of time through the conflict by entrepreneurs to increase profits. 
Those developments could be in the product themselves, such as making them last longer or 
increasing methods of efficiency, to better methods in meeting supply and demand through 
improvements in delivery technologies (Thornton 2007:77-78). 
 The concepts of prohibition go against the standards of a free market. Still, the market-
process approach can help describe its effects on an economy or technological developments by 
focusing on the differences in the processes of each. Prohibition is more than simple government 
interventionism, which is “a form of governmental control or direction of resources that were 
private property” (Thornton 2007:79). Interventionism often utilizes “prohibition (which) 
establishes bureaucracy not to intervene in the market but to replace it” (Thornton 2007:80). The 
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developments of new technologies from various concepts such as the market-process approach, 
which explains these developments are due to competition for profits, does not exist in the 
bureaucratic model of prohibition that is dictated by laws and rules void of the need for profits: 
Businesses are spurred on to implement new production methods, cost-cutting 
techniques, product enhancements, and new services in order to avoid losses and achieve 
profits. The discovery process is made easier because the market consists of many 
entrepreneurs who develop innovations that are generally recognizable and readily 
copied. The bureaucrat has no such luxury. Bureaus are centrally directed and guided by 
rules: they have little access to outside sources… there is little scope for encouraging 
discovery by bureaucrats or for rewarding bureaucrats for discovery (Thornton 2007:81). 
 
Bureaucratic direction is considered even less effective on developments when the bureaucrats 
themselves are in no way rewarded for success. There are even cases of successful bureaucrats 
being punished for effectiveness. Take, for example, the dismissal of two agents during 
Prohibition known as Moe Smith and Izzy Einstein: 
The two of them had raided three thousand speakeasies and arrested 4,900 people. They 
had confiscated five million bottles of bootleg liquor and smashed hundreds of stills... In 
every household from coast to coast Izzy and Moe were living proof that prohibition 
agents could be honest and incorruptible. But to be famous for honesty might seem an 
empty accomplishment when it was rewarded by dismissal (Coffey 1975:176-177). 
 
The activities of the bureaucracy enforcing Prohibition shows by its own actions that 
development and success under bureaucratic guidance is not encouraged while it introduces a 
shortage in the commodity increasing cost and demand. 
 Still, developments in technology do take place during times of prohibition. These 
changes are not due to the market itself, but to the intervention in the market. “The elimination or 
control of a particular economic activity produces profit opportunities that previously did not 
exist” (Thornton 2007:82). These opportunities are produced in direct opposition to the rules 
placed by those enacting prohibition. This conflict for profit often culminates in the following: 
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The profit opportunities created by prohibition will result in new methods of production, 
transportation, inventory, distribution, and marketing. The product, its quality, and 
attributes will experience tremendous change moving from a competitive market 
environment to one dominated by prohibition (Thornton 2007:82). 
 
This was the case with the Prohibition Era within the United States. Whiskey stills and 
speakeasies became commonplace during Prohibition as well as developments in the efficiency 
of transportation of illegal alcohol both on land and via waterways. 
Discussion Format 
 This thesis, in seeking to find if the Prohibition Era spurred marine innovation, will 
discuss the history of Prohibition in the United States and then look at a variety of related 
subjects regarding technology, not only the vessels used during this period. The subject of 
marine innovation during Prohibition has not been directly focused on before, making it best to 
first examine some of the more obvious developments that came about during this time. Doing so 
requires a scope of research broader than one that concentrates only on the vessels themselves. 
This is in keeping with the notion of providing a base framework for future studies into 
Prohibition marine innovations as they are “rediscovered” due to their naturally clandestine 
nature (see Chapter Six: Further Studies).  In discussing these innovations the history behind the 
technology will also be explored as well as any individuals involved in their creation. This may 
show the importance of not just the developed technology by comparing it to what came before, 
but also the reasons why further exploration of the overall topic could lead to significant 
discoveries in the history of marine technology utilized today.  
 
 CHAPTER TWO: HISTORY OF PROHIBITION 
 
On January 16, 1919 the 18
th
 Amendment to the Constitution of the United States was 
ratified, ushering in and setting the stage for America’s Age of Prohibition: 
The Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
Section 1. 
After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale or transportation 
of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof 
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage 
purposes is hereby prohibited. 
Section 2. 
The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by 
appropriate legislation. 
Section 3. 
This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the 
Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, 
within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress. 
(United States Constitution) 
 
After nearly a century and a half as an independent and free nation, suddenly the land of the free 
had elected to restrict a freedom that had characterized it. In fact, drinking had become a way of 
life amongst Americans. Captain Frederick Marryat was of the opinion that: 
I am sure the Americans can fix nothing without a drink. If you meet, you drink; if you 
part, you drink; if you make acquaintance, you drink; if you close a bargain, you drink; 
they quarrel in their drink, and they make up with a drink. They drink because it is hot; 
they drink because it is cold. If successful in elections, they drink and rejoice; if not, they 
drink and swear; they begin to drink early in the morning, they leave off late at night; 
they commence it early in life, and they continue it, until they soon drop into the grave 
(Marryat 1839:124). 
 
Drinking was a very ingrained part of American culture. It was said that “Americans drank from 
the crack of dawn to the crack of dawn” (Rorabaugh 1979:20-21). So why did America give up 
its national spirits of which it seemed so fond? A democracy does not simply give up one of its 
freedoms overnight and, indeed, this was not the case. The Prohibition movement was over a 
century in the making before culminating in the form of the 18
th
 Amendment. It was the result of 
religious beliefs which coupled with very charismatic leadership and new political movements 
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such as women’s suffrage. 
 Before ratification in 1919, the United States was not a stranger to the ideas of 
prohibition. There were attempts at it even before the nation was founded, during the colonial 
period. An example of this is in May of 1657 when the sale of strong liquor “whether known by 
the name of rumme [sic], strong water, wine brandy, etc.” was made illegal by the General Court 
of Massachusetts (Blue 2004:73). This movement was mainly an effort to remove the “sinn [sic] 
of drunkenness” from Native Americans via colonial trade (Mancall 1997:104). Similar 
legislation was also passed in Maine by the end of the seventeenth century for similar reasons 
(Mancall 1997:104-105). Both of these instances were directly derived from Puritan religious 
beliefs; one of the main driving forces also behind the American Prohibition movement.  
 Despite alcohol being considered “the water of life” and “the good creature of god” by 
western Christianity, religious beliefs were not prepared for the “recent” invention of distilled 
spirits which led to a stronger form of alcohol (Clark 1976:14-15). Once Arnaud de Villeneuve 
translated Arabian alchemist Gerber’s efforts, the thirteenth century saw not the creation, but the 
major introduction of the process for distilled spirits we know today. Villeneuve attributed 
healing properties to the distilling product, claiming it “prolongs life, clears away ill-humors, 
revives the heart, and maintains youth” (Curtis 2006:22). The distilled spirits were mainly used 
as medicines until records during the sixteenth century show their use for other more casual 
purposes: 
During the French Wars of Religion and the Revolt of the Netherlands, when Europe was 
for years in a vast turmoil of massacre and riot, or religious refugees and political 
murders, of English, Spanish, Dutch, and French Armies… Then apparently millions of 
distressed people were learning that aqua vitae (water of life), even more than wine, 
could offer a warm if momentary comfort for misery or grief or despair. Only then did 
Western culture begin to accommodate “ardent spirits,” or the “strong drink” of modern 
times (Clark 1976:15). 
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It was after this transformation of spirits from their medicinal uses to the more casual indulgence 
that public drunkenness became an issue and increased at a considerable rate. This is easily 
marked by legislation and punishments at the time. One example of such was the drunkard’s 
cloak, which consisted of a barrel with holes cut out for the offender’s hands and head. The 
individual being punished walked around town while wearing this heavy apparatus so that their 
peers and fellow townspeople could jeer them. Being put in the stocks was also proposed as 
appropriate punishment for public drunkenness in a 1605 act. King James I approved of this in 
1623, leaving those convicted of public drunkenness the option of paying five shillings or 
spending six hours in the stocks (Andrews 1991:140). 
 Public drunkenness continued and led to efforts of containment not only in England, but 
also in the British colonies. In what could be described as a near prediction of what transpired 
after the passing of the 18
th
 Amendment, the colony of Georgia’s Governor prohibited the 
importation of distilled spirits into his colony in 1735, marking the first statewide alcohol ban. 
This act passed by British Parliament showed obvious flaws in the enforceability of prohibition. 
Farmers began to grow and sell the means to manufacture their own moonshine instead of 
tending to their regular crops, and law enforcement regularly took bribes instead of enforcing the 
law (Behr 1996:13). Rumrunners in America began to frequent Savannah harbor and even when 
caught they were “tried before a jury of their peers; (whom) few of them ever voted for 
conviction” (Clark 1976:16). The unpopularity of the Georgia law along with the inability to 
enforce it led to its abandonment in 1743, only seven years after its inception.   
 While not considered a movement in prohibition, the United States Government imposed 
whiskey taxes. These were to be used to help reduce the national debt after the American 
Revolution and were heavily supported by social reformers, who hoped that a “sin tax” might 
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raise public awareness of the harmful effects of alcohol (Slaughter 1986:100). The Whiskey 
Rebellion in western Pennsylvania was a direct result of opposition to the tax, which was later 
repealed by Thomas Jefferson during his presidency (Blocker 1989:16). 
 All of these movements for prohibition suffered from not only being unpopular amongst 
the American population, but also from an unwillingness of public leadership to support a total 
commitment to prohibition. One such example is that of Benjamin Rush. This Philadelphia 
physician was friend to both Thomas Jefferson and John Adams, along with being a signer of the 
Declaration of Independence.  Rush mainly believed in temperance, or moderation in place of 
prohibition, and came up with the suggestion of a replacement beverage for distilled spirits: wine 
mixed with opium, commonly known as laudanum (Clark 1976:9). 
 Charismatic and dedicated leadership for prohibition eventually began to come about in 
the early 19
th
 century. One such advocate was Neal Dow (Figure 1), who had already 
accomplished the previously unthinkable task of persuading the volunteer fire department in his 
home town of Portland, Maine to “ban alcohol at its musters” (Clark 1976:11). After successfully 
inheriting and running his family’s tannery, Dow set the precedent for other businesses to 
exclude their daily grog time. Through his passion for prohibition, Dow impressed not only 
individuals such as P.T. Barnum, who claimed in relation to the evils of alcohol “Neal Dow… 
Had opened our eyes,” but also enough Portland citizens to be elected Mayor of the city in 1851 
(Clark 1976:11). Upon election, Dow “immediately persuaded the Maine legislature to enact the 
nation’s first statewide prohibitory law, mandating fines for those convicted of selling liquor and 
imprisonment for those engaged in its manufacture” (Clark 1976:11). Dow’s efforts inspired 
other like-minded individuals to take up the call for prohibition and resulted in several other 
states following Maine’s example, effectively making Dow somewhat of a national celebrity. 
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However, all of this came crashing down in 1855 when unrest broke out in Dow’s hometown of 
Portland amongst “Irish immigrants who despised Dow and his law” (Clark 1976:12). After the 
unrest resulted in several deaths, laws were weakened by the belief of the Republican Party that 
“prohibitionism [sic] was divisive and might weaken the unity that had formed in the young 
party around the slavery issue” (Clark 1976:12). Several states had, by the end of the decade, 
repealed legislation similar to the Maine Law, including namesake law itself. 
 
Figure 1. An engraving of Neal Dow, Mayor of Portland, ME (Clubb 1856:Frontispiece). 
Religious organizations both in and out of the United States also began to move from 
simple temperance to the abolition of alcohol consumption altogether. Social evils were 
attributed to heavy drinking, even by leaders in the Catholic Church such as the Archbishop of 
Ireland, who said: 
We have seen there is no hope for improving in any way or form the liquor traffic; there 
is nothing now to be done but to wipe it out completely. The state alone can save us. 
Would God place in my hand a wand with which to dispel the evil of intemperance, I 
would strike the door of every saloon, of every distillery, of every brewery, until the 
accursed traffic should be wiped from the face of the earth (Willebrandt, 1929:343). 
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The interesting portion of the Archbishop’s urge for action is the call for the state to do 
something, not just the morality of the church. This call for law was also echoed by the 
Protestants, as the plea for prohibition went out from the General Assembly of the Presbyterian 
Church: 
The experience of two hundred years proves that this evil can never be removed or 
effectively resisted while the traffic in intoxication liquors is continued, it being 
necessary, if we would stop the effect, to remove the cause…Laws prohibiting the sale of 
intoxicating drinks can interfere with the rights to no man; because no man has a right of 
any name or nature inconsistent with the public good, or at war with the welfare of the 
community; it being well known, universally acknowledged maxim of law the “no man 
has a right to use his own to the injury of his neighbor” (Colvin 1926:265). 
 
The notion that two factions of a religion that had been known for considerable disagreements 
with each other since the Protestant Reformation in 1517 were now willing to see this issue in a 
similar manner led to a bond that culminated in the foundation of the Prohibition Party in 1869. 
This party campaigned on a platform of nothing less than a Constitutional amendment that 
exercised: 
The legal prohibition in the District of Columbia, the territories, and in every other place 
subject to the laws of Congress, of the importation, exportation, manufacture and traffic 
of all alcoholic beverages, as high crimes against society; an amendment to the national 
Constitution to render these prohibitory measures universal and permanent; and the 
adoption of treaty stipulations with foreign power to prevent the importation and 
exportation of all alcohol beverages (Krout 1925:189). 
 
The idea of prohibition also pulled together women all over the nation. While men prescribed to 
the original idea that consumption was good for their health and generally enjoyed drinking, 
women believed in the religious notion of true motherhood, part of which was refraining from 
the consumption of alcohol. Middle class women were often viewed as the moral authorities of 
their household and saw the drinking of alcohol as a threat to their homes (Blocker 1989:74-76). 
Men mostly took to saloons for their drinking, and women had the view that: 
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A drunken husband and father was sufficient cause for pain, but many rural and small-
town women also had to endure the associated ravages born of the early saloon: the 
wallet emptied into a bottle; the job lost or the farmwork [sic] left undone; and, most 
pitilessly, a scourge that would later in the century be identified by physicians as 
“syphilis of the innocent”- venereal disease contracted by the wives of drink-sodden 
husbands who had found something more than liquor lurking in saloons. Saloons were 
dark and nasty places, and to the wives of the men inside, they were satanic (Okrent 
2010:16). 
 
The hatred of booze and saloons brought together many prominent women such as Susan B. 
Anthony, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucy Stone and Amelia Bloomer, all of whom later became 
known for their pioneering efforts in women’s suffrage. “One could make the argument that 
without the ‘liquor evil,’ as it was commonly known to those who most despised it, the suffrage 
movement would not have drawn the talents and energies of these gifted women” (Okrent 
2010:15). 
 The prohibition movement among women brought together not only the prominent but 
also the common women as well.  The year 1874 saw the foundation of the Woman’s Christian 
Temperance Union (WCTU), an organization under Frances Willard (Figure 2), that had a 
membership of over 250,000 prohibition supporters (Okrent 2010:16). However, it was not 
simply prohibition that the WTCU supported. There were a number of beliefs Willard held as 
important and threw the weight of the WCTU behind. Examples of these beliefs were “agitating 
for the eight-hour day, workers’ rights…vegetarianism, cremation, (and) less restrictive women’s 
clothing” (Okrent 2010:19). This lack of focus on just one issue led to a straining of resources 
and focus among the WCTU, arguably making the group’s prohibition efforts not as effective as 
they could have been. 
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Figure 2. Frances Willard of the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (Willard 
1889:Frontispiece). 
 
 The Anti-Saloon League, or ASL, was founded in 1893. When contrasted with Willard’s 
“Do Everything” WCTU, the ASL suffered no distractions and focused solely on the goal of 
prohibition: 
The Anti-Saloon League is not in politics as a party, nor are we trying to abolish vice, 
gambling, horse-racing, murder, theft or arson. The gold standard, the unlimited coinage 
of silver, protection, free trade, and currency reform, do not concern us in the least 
(Westheimer 1909:131-139). 
 
 Reverend Howard Hyde Russell founded the ASL and directed that “the League was to be 
staffed by paid workers,” which meant individuals could dedicate their full time to the cause of 
national prohibition (Blocker 1989:96).  Russell’s first recruit for this full time endeavor was an 
Oberlin College graduate named Wayne Wheeler (Figure 3). 
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 Wheeler was everything the ASL needed in leadership, often described as tireless, 
dedicated, and even referred to by a former classmate as a “locomotive in trousers” (Okrent 
2010:39). As an organizer, Wheeler remained focused on using balance of power efforts in 
politics to place whomever the League believed would champion their efforts for the cause of 
prohibition within legislature. Wheeler also persisted on the ASL staying apolitical in their 
efforts. Whichever candidate was for prohibition was supported by the ASL come election time 
regardless of the candidate’s political party. This concept allowed the ASL a great deal of 
“flexibility; it was prepared to take advantage of every opportunity, and it could change direction 
at a moment’s notice, even when such a change involved the apparent reversal of policies which 
had long been regarded as fundamental” (Asbury 1968:121). 
The ASL also focused its efforts initially on the ground level in politics, often referred to 
as the local option. The group “discouraged state-wide and national prohibition movements on 
the ground that the country would not be ready for them until the drying up of the towns and 
counties, or at least a sizable majority of them, had been accomplished” (Asbury 1968:121). 
Wheeler and the ASL accomplished this goal by working with the minorities during elections. In 
Wheeler’s own words: 
I do it the way the bosses do it…with minorities. There are some anti-saloon voters in 
every community. I and other speakers increase the number and the passion of them. I list 
and bind them to vote as I bid. I say “We’ll all vote against the men in office who don’t 
support our bills. We’ll vote for candidates who will promise to. They’ll break their 
promise. Sure. Next time we’ll break them.” And we can. We did (Blocker 1989:96-97). 
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Figure 3. Wayne Wheeler of the Anti-Saloon League (Courtesy of the Library of Congress, 
Washington, D.C. 1910s.) 
 
 Over time these local efforts by the ASL collectively resulted in control of legislators in a 
multitude of states. This increase in support led to the natural evolution in changing from a local 
to a state-wide stance in the particular states that consisted of towns and counties that had 
adopted a dry stance. Eventually entire states began to pass dry laws: 
In 1907 the Georgia Legislature passed a dry law, and that same year Oklahoma voted for 
a constitutional amendment by a majority of 18,103. Mississippi and North Carolina 
adopted statutory prohibition in 1908, Tennessee did the same in 1909, and in 1912 an 
amendment was added to the constitution of West Virginia by a dry majority of 92,342 
(Asbury 1968:121-122). 
 
Wheeler and the ASL were able to achieve this foothold in the American South through a 
collaboration of their non-bipartisan “any means necessary” methods and highly focused 
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propaganda.  American geographic regions held different beliefs and ideologies, and each had to 
be taken into consideration when trying to win them over to the side of prohibition. In the case of 
the American South, “the southerners were ardent advocates of personal liberty; they deeply 
resented any attempt to interfere with their traditional rights and customs, one of which was to 
drink what and when they wished” (Asbury 1968:122). Wheeler and the ASL circumvented the 
South’s defense of personal liberties in regards to alcohol by appealing to another of their long 
held traditions: racism and the stereotyping of blacks.  This is not to say that the majority of 
southerners were ardent racists, nor is to say that it was a belief shared only within the confines 
of the old Confederacy.  The statistics to support either idea are just not available. Still, in 
keeping with the ASL’s tactics of working with marginalized populations to win local elections, 
the utilization of racism helped distract from the fact that they were advocating the voluntary 
signing away of personal liberty.  
A multitude of different propaganda efforts were used in areas the ASL believed could be 
most effective when it came to the demonization of the “black man” and whiskey. Some 
attempted to take the moral highroad (if such a thing can be said in regards to racism) by 
appealing to a protective nature. An article in Collier’s suggests “white men are beginning to see 
that moral responsibility for the negro rests on them, and that it is a betrayal of responsibility to 
permit illicit sales of dangerous liquors and drugs” (Whaley 1913:32). Thomas Dixon Jr., a 
writer from the early twentieth century, did not choose a moral high ground and instead 
portrayed black men with “eyes bloodshot with whiskey (who) wander the streets and invade the 
homes of whites, their extravagant drunkenness intensifying the constant threat of plunder and 
rape” (Okrent 2010:43).  
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Many also tied in prohibition to Jim Crow laws, attempting to remove both bottle and 
ballot from hands of the black men. Images were made of “the waking nightmare of a black man 
with a bottle of whiskey in one hand and a ballot in the other” (Okrent 2010:43). All of these 
efforts eventually led to the many southern states falling in line with the ASL and prohibition. 
 The inevitable next step for the ASL and prohibition was to transcend from the state level 
and move onto the national platform. Issues began to arise with the transportation of liquor from 
“wet” states into those that had adopted “bone dry” (meaning the state forbid any possession or 
consumption of liquor) legislation. To address this, the ASL lobbied Congress to adopt the 
Webb-Kenyon Act, “which prohibited interstate shipment of liquor into a state contrary to the 
laws of that state” (Blocker 1989:112). This piece of legislation showed how much control and 
influence prohibition was gaining on a national level when: 
In February of 1913 Congress passed the Webb-Kenyon Law, which President William 
Howard Taft vetoed when his Attorney General, George W. Wickersham, expressed the 
opinion that it was unconstitutional. Both branches of Congress immediately passed the 
bill over the President’s veto, the Senate on February 28 by a vote of sixty-three to 
twenty-one, and the House on March 1 by a vote of 244 to ninety-five. Some years later 
the law was upheld by the Supreme Court (Asbury 1968:124). 
 
Webb-Kenyon proved to be “disappointing, for it provided no penalties, and for many months 
Congress neglected to appropriate funds for its enforcement” (Asbury 1968:124). Despite the 
setback in enforceability, the Webb-Kenyon Act was hailed as a success by the ASL.  
 Another hurdle that was soon to be overcome by the Anti-Saloon League was that of the 
revenue issue. America had a liquor tax in place since 1862 to help fund its efforts during the 
Civil War. In the eyes of the prohibition movement, this “made Uncle Sam to some extent a 
partner in the profits of the distilling and brewing industries and so would discourage him from 
helping to exterminate them” (Furnas 1965:210). In 1913 America adopted the 16th Amendment, 
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which gave Congress the power to collect income tax. Shortly after the passing of this 
Amendment, the ASL gave a statement: 
The chief cry against national prohibition…has been that the government must have the 
revenue…The adoption of the Income Tax Amendment to the Federal Constitution 
furnishes an answer to the revenue problem…National Prohibition…can be secured 
through the adoption of a Constitutional Amendment (Okrent 2010:58). 
 
With both support in Congress and help from the Income Tax Amendment, the drafting and 
passing of prohibition legislation seemed inevitable.  
 The ASL and the national prohibition movement continued to gather steam. Rather than 
forcing moves that could be considered strong-arm tactics in Congress, the ASL and Wheeler 
went back to placing more members in Congress that supported a vote for prohibition. Despite 
gaining many seats during the elections of 1914, “the leaders of the Anti-Saloon League were 
under no illusion as to their strength in Congress; they didn’t control two thirds of the votes in 
either house, and knew they couldn’t hope to do so for at least another two years” (Asbury 
1968:128). The ASL put as much effort and fervor as they had with all of their other endeavors 
into the campaigns of 1916. In the end, these efforts were successful, as Wayne Wheeler put it: 
We laid down such a barrage as candidates for Congress had never seen before… On 
election night the lights burned late at our Washington office… We knew late election 
night that we had won… We knew that the prohibition amendment would be submitted to 
the states by the Congress just elected… (Asbury 1968:128-129). 
 
Wheeler was correct. On January 16, 1919, the Sixty-fifth Congress (elected in 1916) passed the 
18
th
 Amendment to the United States Constitution, instituting prohibition on the Federal level. 
 It is worth mentioning the commonly held belief that the outbreak of World War I helped 
the efforts of the Anti-Saloon League and other groups seeking prohibition. The aforementioned 
belief, usually referenced by those who opposed the 18
th
 Amendment, was to attribute “the 
amendment’s adoption to the absence of two million soldiers from American shores and voting 
21 
 
booths” (Okrent 2010:97-98). This assumes that, not only were those Americans that were 
serving in Europe for the war effort opposed prohibition but also that they were of age to vote. 
While the legality of serving the country underage makes the research of finding out exactly how 
many of those in the armed service during World War I were below the legal age to vote, an 
extreme example can be made of Albert Cohen of Memphis, Tennessee. Cohen is reputed to be 
the youngest American to see combat during World War I due to his enlistment at age thirteen 
(Rosen 2005:8). President Woodrow Wilson’s War Revenue Acts, “which increased liquor taxes 
to help finance the war effort, (which) in effect made the purchase of alcoholic beverages in the 
early days of World War I a patriotic act” were also in opposition to this belief (Okrent 2010:98). 
 Heavy anti-German sentiments that World War I had brought to the forefront also 
worked against the patriotic notion that the liquor tax had put into effect. These sentiments were 
easily exploited by supporters of prohibition. America’s breweries were owned by those with 
clear German heritage. Names such as Busch (Figure 4), Hamm, Pabst, Ruppert, and Schmidt 
were at the forefront of the breweries and anti-prohibition groups. The public image of the 
German brewery owners was also easy to exploit due to some of their own actions: 
The Busches were especially attached to their ancestral home… Adolphus (Busch) had 
been decorated by the Kaiser (who had visited Villa Lilly, the Busch family estate in 
Langenschwalbach); two of Adolphus and Lilly’s daughters were married to German 
military officers; and son August- head of the family after Adolphus’s death- threw 
annual parties at his Missouri farm in honor of the Kaiser’s birthday. Vacationing in 
Langenschwalbach in the summer of 1914, Adolphus’s widow had even chosen to remain 
there when World War I broke out (Okrent 2010:85). 
 
These actions were easily made into propaganda that took root in typically xenophobic areas 
such as the American South.  
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Figure 4. Portrait of Adolphus Busch. Oil on canvas (Courtesy of Anders Zorn 1897). 
 With the passing of the 18
th
 Amendment, Prohibition was implemented into effect on 
January 16, 1920, exactly one year after ratification. Prohibition introduced multiple major 
problems, including ways to enforce the law itself. Further legislation was needed to “engrave 
into law the procedures, penalties, appropriations, exceptions, and hundreds of other necessary 
details that the 112 words of the Eighteenth Amendment didn’t begin to address” (Okrent 
2010:106-107). The legislation that set about to accomplish this was the Volstead Act, which 
saw its own share of problems. 
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The Volstead Act 
With the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment in January, 1919, the knowledge 
became commonplace to the American public that prohibition was to be enacted a year later. The 
issues that were not made clear through the broad verbiage of the amendment were the 
enforcement policies involved with the prohibition of alcohol. The Eighteenth Amendment 
prohibited the manufacture, sale or transportation of intoxicating liquors. However, the 
Amendment failed to provide definitions for terms such as “intoxicating liquors” or establish 
penalties for any violations. The intentions of the Eighteenth Amendment were brought forward, 
defined, and coded for enforcement in the National Prohibition Act, also known as the Volstead 
Act. 
The Volstead Act was named for the Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, 
Andrew Volstead (Figure 5), who was a Minnesota native and had been a member of Congress 
since his election in 1903. After serving sixteen years in the House of Representatives, Volstead 
assumed “chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee and, therefore, responsibility of the National 
Prohibition Act” (Okrent 2010:109). Volstead, whose defining feature was a large moustache 
that covered his entire upper lip, approached matters of Congress systematically and adhered to 
the law. Of note was that Volstead had not been placed in his position in any way by the 
Prohibition Party. In fact, Volstead “had never used the Prohibition platform as part of his 
election campaign strategy… [and] On two occasions… his unsuccessful challengers to his 
House of Representatives seat had even been Prohibition Candidates” (Behr 1996:77). Volstead 
applied his systematic and law abiding spirit to the creation and application of the National 
Prohibition Act.  
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Figure 5. Andrew Volstead (Courtesy of the Library of Congress, Washington D.C. 1920s). 
 Common belief attributes much of the writing of the National Prohibition Act to Wayne 
Wheeler of the Anti-Saloon League. This may stem from the “fact Wheeler did fashion a version 
of a Prohibition enforcement law out of a number of existing state laws and presented it to 
Volstead and to the measure’s Senate sponsors” (Okrent 2010:110). Volstead, falling back on his 
career as a lawyer prior to employment in Congress, found Wheeler’s recommendations “too 
loosely drawn,” (Volstead 1934) leaving obvious loopholes in the legislation that could be 
exploited. After several months of deliberation by the committee assigned to draft the National 
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Prohibition Act, which included visits by Wayne Wheeler, the measure was completed. Not one 
of the sixty-seven sections of the Volstead Act was ever found to be unconstitutional, a testament 
to the work put into the act by Andrew Volstead and the rest of the Congressional Committee 
that helped draft the bill.  
 Despite its framework being upheld legally, the National Prohibition Act did meet with 
some opposition. It was expected, as this: 
Was the last chance of the wets to modify the Eighteenth Amendment, and the Anti-
Saloon League anticipated, and prepared for, a hard fight in both the House and the 
Senate. But the wets were so dispirited and disorganized that they made little resistance, 
and the Volstead Act passed the House in October 1919 by a vote of 287 to 100 (Asbury 
1968:134). 
 
The unexpected part came in a veto by President Woodrow Wilson. After the Act’s introductory 
statements, the first section deals with control and enforcement of wartime prohibition. America 
had already entered World War I, and: 
He [President Wilson] pointed out that the war emergency no longer existed, and urged 
the repeal of that section of the law. Two hours after Congress received the President’s 
message, the House voted overwhelmingly to override his veto. Similar action was taken 
[the] next day by the Senate (Asbury 1968:134). 
 
Despite President Wilson’s claims that the Act was unconstitutional and unethical, it still went 
into effect along with the Eighteenth Amendment.  
 Following the section on wartime prohibition, the Volstead Act proceeded to address 
rules and regulations for common American citizens in regards to prohibition. “Intoxicating 
liquor” was defined early on as those liquids containing one-half of one per centum or more of 
alcohol by volume which is fit for use for beverage purposes.  The name it might fall under, such 
as brandy, whiskey, rum, etc., beer, ale, porter, and wine was also included with the mention that 
even if they were below the requirement of being branded intoxicating liquor, they still were 
considered a controlled substance and could only be produced under certain strict criteria 
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(National Prohibition Act Title I Sec. 1, Title II Sec 1). The guidelines for penalties were also 
stated along with defining the agency in charge of enforcing prohibition. Rather than have the 
United States Justice Department handle the enforcement of the 18
th
 Amendment, Wayne 
Wheeler lobbied heavily for control to be given to the Treasury Department, a decision 
reinforced through the passing of the National Prohibition Act. This handed the responsibility of 
enforcement over to the Internal Revenue Service, Customs Services, and the United States 
Coast Guard (National Prohibition Act Title II Sec. 2). Rules and regulations for prescribed 
alcohol used for medicinal purposes along with those liquids to be utilized in religious practices 
were also included in this section. 
 The last section of the National Prohibition Act detailed the guidelines for manufacturing 
industrial alcohol. This ranged from the production of alcohol for use in dyes and fuels all the 
way to usage for scientific purposes. This section also covers the importation or introduction of 
alcohol within “the Canal Zone,” which included the Panama Canal and the Panama Railroad. As 
with the first and second sections, penalties were assigned to violations of the regulations that 
had been set (National Prohibition Act Title III).  
 Despite the efforts made by Andrew Volstead to make the National Prohibition Act void 
of legal loopholes, flaws eventually started to show. These were mainly due to the human 
element of enforcement once the law was set into motion. A large portion of these flaws came 
from the assignment of enforcing prohibition to the Treasury Department, a division of 
government that was ill prepared to handle the task at best. These problems were compounded 
even more when the Treasury Department had only been given a year of preparation for their 
expected duties (Okrent 2010:134-137). 
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The United States Coast Guard During Prohibition 
In response to handling their newfound task of enforcing prohibition, the United States 
Treasury Department founded the Bureau of Prohibition. These 1,500 individuals, along with 
state law enforcement officials and the Customs Service, were responsible for upholding the law 
of prohibition. The duty of enforcing the laws of Prohibition at sea was given to the United 
States Coast Guard as part of the Treasury Department’s doling out of responsibility (Ensign 
1997:4).  
 Contrary to popular belief, the United States Coast Guard was not originally founded as 
only a life saving, sea based organization. The Coast Guard is actually the combination of five 
Federal agencies: the Lighthouse Service, the Revenue Cutter Service, the Steamboat Inspection 
Service, the Bureau of Navigation, and the Lifesaving Service (Willoughby 1964:21-24). Many 
of these organizations had overlapping duties and unclear lines with their jurisdiction and 
responsibilities. Over time, in an attempt to establish a simpler bureaucracy and alleviate 
complications, these organizations were folded into one branch under the control of the United 
States Treasury Department. This led to the formation of the United States Coast Guard. 
However, combating smuggling was an original duty of the Revenue Cutter Service: 
With the construction of 10 revenue cutters [in 1790], the Revenue Cutter Service was 
tasked with the protection of customs, as smuggling deprived the Treasury Department of 
legal duties on imports. In 1915, the Revenue Cutter Service was joined with the 
Lifesaving Service and renamed the Coast Guard. Although the Coast Guard continued to 
be tasked with the prevention of smuggling, in the years immediately following the Coast 
Guard’s reorganization, the preservation of life and property at sea became a major focus 
for Coast Guard efforts (Ensign 2001:7). 
 
The Coast Guard found itself unprepared for dealing with rumrunners at the start of Prohibition 
despite one of the organizations folded into the more comprehensive Coast Guard having its 
foundation in stopping smuggling activities. This was due to a few reasons, but the one at the 
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forefront was that most members of the Coast Guard viewed the unpopular duty of enforcing 
prohibition not as important as their other responsibilities. This led to Coast Guard Cutters not 
actively pursuing rumrunners. In the words of one former Coast Guard member: 
The few rummies we caught during those early days of National Aridity were more the 
result of accident than design, like those which became temporarily crippled because of 
motor failure and the odd ones our “sandpounder” patrols [patrols along beaches by 
Coast Guard personnel on foot or vehicle] stumbled upon during the course of an 
unloading operation (Waters 2007:45). 
 
Another reason the Coast Guard was initially considered ineffective at enforcing prohibition was 
due to the equipment being used by them in comparison to those being utilized by rumrunners: 
Our fleet [the Coast Guard] of seagoing cutters was designed more for humanitarian 
duties than law enforcement- Ice Patrol, Bering Sea Patrol, Winter Cruising, salvage and 
rescue operations. Their top speed was around twelve knots, and many were coal-burners. 
They posed not the slightest worry or threat to the rummies (Waters 2007:45-46). 
 
This led to many of the seized rumrunner vessels being turned around for use by the Coast Guard 
to catch similar vessels.  These halcyon days for the rumrunners lasted from the onset of 
Prohibition into 1924, when the United States Coast Guard underwent major changes to its 
budget in order to accomplish its mission goals. This was due to “the amount of liquor coming 
into the United States from the sea… steadily increasing” (Willoughby 1964:29). 
 This increased amount of smuggling created the need for a much improved Coast Guard 
that could keep up with its prohibition responsibilities and also to keep those at sea safe. This 
concept included even the rumrunners. With the induction of prohibition came a rise in piracy off 
the coasts of the United States. One such serious example took place on: 
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The Nova Scotia schooner J. Scott Hankenson [that] was lying 15 miles off Rockport, 
Mass., waiting to dispose of her cargo. The motorboat Grayhound, a previous customer, 
came alongside with apparently two men who boarded Hankenson. One whipped out a 
gun and summarily shot the captain in the back. This was the signal for seven more 
heavily armed men to climb over the side. Not satisfied with shooting the skipper, they 
shot the cook when he moved to defend himself, and the crew were confined to the 
forecastle. The pirates helped themselves to all the liquor which remained, and departed 
with cash variously reported as between $35 and $20,000! (Willoughby 1964:41) 
 
These kinds of events, along with territory disputes involving seizures of liquor cargos past the 
three mile limit, put pressure on the United States Federal Government in regards to prohibition 
concepts and policies. The time had come to take the policing of the seas seriously and the 
solution was found to be an increase in the budget for the Coast Guard. The Annual Report of 
June 30, 1923 by the Secretary of the Treasury stated: 
With a view to lessening the smuggling of liquor into this country, it is recommended that 
the appropriation for the Coast Guard be increased by $28,500,000 for the next fiscal 
year. This will enable the department to purchase 20 additional seagoing cutters, to 
purchase or construct 203 motor boats of the cabin cruiser type, and 91 small motor boats 
to be used at Coast Guard stations, and to increase the personnel of officers and enlisted 
men of the Coast Guard by 3,535. The seagoing Coast Guard cutters will serve as bases 
for the large fleet of motor boats intended to be used in patrolling inlets and the entrances 
to harbors, and will watch ‘rum vessels’ lying off the coasts and follow them as occasion 
requires. It is hoped that with such equipment the smuggling of liquor may be reduced to 
a minimum (United States Treasury Department 1923). 
 
This expansion was accepted and opened what has been referred to as the second phase in the 
Rum War (Willoughby 1964:43). 
The United States Navy loaned out twenty destroyers that were assigned to the Coast 
Guard (Figure 6). These destroyers still needed to be refurbished and refitted as they had been 
mothballed in the channels behind the Philadelphia Navy Yard, but they were just what the Coast 
Guard needed: 
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All the old “tin cans” were oil-burners, with steam turbines for propulsion. Top speed 
ranged from twenty-six knots up to thirty. They had been stripped of their wartime 
torpedo tubes and depth charge-throwing guns, but had been left with their main batteries 
of 4” 50 and 3” 50 caliber guns. In addition each mounted a one-pounder quick-firing gun 
for close-in work, and of course a formidable armory of machine guns, rifles and pistols 
(Waters 2007: 52). 
 
Various smaller craft were acquisitioned along with these destroyers as well as the 
implementation of quickly recruiting and training personnel to be Coast Guard crews. With its 
newfound budget combined with an increase in equipment as well as the numbers of crew, 
prohibition could now be considered enforceable by the Coast Guard. This resulted in many 
successful cruises against rumrunners. However, these increases prompted a response from those 
involved in the smuggling of liquor in the United States, mainly in the form of more organized 
crime syndicates replacing the usual “rummie.” 
 
Figure 6. A group of Navy Destroyers given to the United States Coast Guard (Carse 
2007:93).  
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The Rumrunners 
The United States officially went “dry” the morning of January 17, 1920. However, 
Prohibition did little to curb the consumption of alcohol by its citizens. As Oscar Wilde once 
said, “You can’t make people good by Act of Parliament.” Strangely enough prohibition had the 
opposite effect that groups like the ASL and the WCTU had hoped it might have. Drinking had 
instead become the new fad of the 1920s. Even though legitimate drinking establishments had 
been abolished, it was still considered easy to find a drink with every town having speakeasies 
and other lower-class establishments that sold alcohol (nicknamed blind pigs) springing up to 
take their place. New York had 32,000 such “hidden” places where an individual could “wet 
their whistle.” The alcoholic beverages themselves were provided through various sources such 
as: 
Medicinal, sold by doctors’ prescriptions and through drugstores; “near beer” that was 
often given a strengthening squirt of alcohol just before it was sold over a speakeasy bar; 
industrial alcohol from existing stocks; still-made alcohol and its less potent cousins, 
home-brew beer and home-pressed wine; and smuggled liquor from the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, Canada, Mexico, Cuba and Europe (Carse 2007:5). 
 
With the onset of Prohibition there was money to be made in the providing of illegal spirits to 
those who wished to continue to purchase it. Many considered the importation of alcohol a 
victimless crime and prohibition had almost overnight made criminals out of scores of 
Americans and people of other nationalities that had never broken a law in their lives. A portion 
of these individuals were those who imported one-third of the alcohol America saw during 
Prohibition by sea. These individuals came to be known as rumrunners.  
 During the early years of Prohibition, rum-running vessels came in all shapes and sizes. 
All that was needed to transport alcohol into the United States was a source of alcohol, 
knowledge of a waterway that led into the country and an adequate vessel to cross said 
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waterway.  An extreme example of this was what one reporter witnessed on the Canadian side of 
the St. Lawrence River when Canadian customs officials issued “a bill of lading for Mexico and 
(watched) a two-seated boat rowed into the river” (Okrent 2010:152). However, organization 
soon started to increase among the rumrunners even if the vessels did not change. Captain Bill 
McCoy is credited with establishing the precedent of what became known as Rum Row when 
McCoy’s vessel, Henry L. Marshall, sailed into St. Catherine’s Sound, Georgia in 1921 and 
unloaded a cargo of rye whiskey for a total of $20000. Marshall was: 
A 90-foot fishing schooner, built of white oak by James, of Essex, Massachusetts, with 
pole masts, a semi-knockabout rig, and twin-screw engines with a speed of 7 knots. She 
had a capacity of 1,500 cases in wood or 3,000 cases in burlap packages (Van de Water 
2007:6). 
 
McCoy’s original plan had been to anchor off the coast of Georgia near St. Catherine’s Sound 
and unload the cargo at sea via smaller motorboats. Bad weather forced off the lighters and 
McCoy was forced to take on a pilot and bring Marshall in under high tide. McCoy later 
delivered a load of liquor off the coast of New York through unloading the cargo onto smaller 
motor boats from Marshall while four miles out to sea. Fishing schooners and other vessels of 
this type were perfect for the importation of illegal spirits. Being a vessel type originally made 
for fishing, they were sea worthy and had ample storage along with the ability to cruise for long 
voyages via sails or in and out of inlets through use of their motors (Van de Water 2007:208).  
 Other potential rum smugglers took note of McCoy’s exploits and soon either copied the 
methods employed by McCoy or developed their own. United States territorial limits had been 
set at three miles offshore before prohibition had been put in place. This also created the 
jurisdiction that the Coast Guard was allowed to patrol. The obvious solution for the rumrunners 
in this situation was to park a large vessel loaded with liquor from other countries outside of the 
three mile limit and to have smaller, faster boats unload the cargo and bring it into shore. This 
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system created a line of large vessels over three miles out from the major cities on the United 
States’ east coast that soon came to be known as Rum Row. Smaller and faster craft, known as 
contact vessels, were responsible for transporting the liquor from the cargo ships to shore. These 
varied from “excursion boats, pleasure launches, motor dorys [sic], sailing yachts, cabin cruisers, 
tugboats, even garbage scows” along with small seaplanes (Waters 2007:45). 
 This continued until the Coast Guard expansion in 1924. The Coast Guard became more 
effective in stopping the flow of liquor into the United States via Rum Row with extra personnel 
and craft at sea patrolling for rumrunners. Helping this along was the adoption of the “twelve-
mile treaty” that President Coolidge had recently ratified with Britain, Germany, and Sweden. 
This increased the range of the Coast Guard while performing prohibition duties to “an hour’s 
steaming distance- merely 12 miles on the average” (Willoughby 1964: 51). This hour’s 
steaming distance was in relation to the boat in question of violating prohibition, not the Coast 
Guard vessel. This meant that boats with higher speeds could cover more ground in an hour and 
needed to anchor farther than the twelve miles to unload a liquor cargo. This expansion and new 
legislation put many of the small time rumrunners out of business and allowed for more 
organized crime groups to take their place.  
 With the crime syndicates becoming involved in rum-running, the vessels began to 
change. Boats such as pleasure craft were no longer being utilized to ferry liquor from the sea 
onto the shore. The boats were now all fast, high powered vessels equipped with radios and other 
technology such as: 
Their Diesel engines (that) give them only a maximum of 16 knots, but these have 
Maxim silencers over their exhausts and run with absolute silence. Every ship has a 
short-wave wireless apparatus and is in constant communication with a mob headquarters 
somewhere on the coast which is similarly equipped (Van de Water 2007:212). 
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 Many had been designed by boatyards in the United States, along with Nova Scotia and 
Newfoundland, with the sole purpose of transporting liquor (Figure 7).  As one former 
rumrunner out of Nova Scotia described them: 
A (typical) rum runner (was) very low, everything low constructed; and her engines were 
all muffled- when her engines were running you couldn’t hear a thing (Fultz and Meister 
1984). 
 
 
Figure 7. A Newfoundland Built Rumrunner (Photo Courtesy of J.P. Andrieux, 1920s). 
These increases in technology and investments being made by the syndicates came with a 
level of violence as well. Acts of piracy out at Rum Row became more common along with 
shootouts. These actions even forced out Bill McCoy, as stated by the former rumrunner after a 
brief prison sentence in 1925: 
My crowd has left the racket, squeezed out by big business. They and I belonged to the 
time before modern efficiency took hold, when the old era of sail came back into the 
world for a little while, and racing schooners were talked of and praised; when every man 
took his own risks and played his own game. It was a cleaner game than they play today. 
It was more of a sport than a business (Van de Water 2007:214). 
 
The costs of vessels participating in the actions out at Rum Row were now in excess of 
$100,000. In comparison, McCoy had first purchased Marshall for $20,000. With this constant 
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escalation, along with ever increasing budgets on either side of the conflict, new maritime 
technologies and their applications were tested, utilized, enhanced and perfected (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8. Two Newfoundland Built Rumrunners. Side by side it is easy to see that these 
were produced mainly in numbers for rum-running purposes (Courtesy of J.P. Andrieux, 
1920s). 
 CHAPTER THREE: DEVELOPMENTS WITH RADIO EQUIPMENT 
The first quarter of the 20
th
 century ushered in the technological advances of wireless 
communications and their use at sea. Communications had gone from simple flag signals in the 
19
th
 century, to the use of Morse Code, as well as licensed radio operators onboard vessels 
during the First World War (Bone 1919:120-124). After the sinking of Titanic in 1912, the 
importance of communication at sea was recognized and radio service became more regulated 
and commonplace (Department of Commerce 1916). Along the shorelines of the United States 
and Canada, radio stations for communicating with ships offshore, along with wireless radios on 
seagoing vessels, became the norm (Morrison 2008:6). From the onset of Prohibition, 
rumrunners exploited this system of communications for their own benefit in transporting 
alcohol to the American coast and it fell upon the Coast Guard to find ways to use the 
rumrunner’s own communications against them (Ensign 1997:25). 
Communications between the shore and rumrunners were greatly enhanced after being 
taken over by the crime syndicates that introduced systems of organization along with increased 
funding to their operations. Through radio communications, rumrunners “would receive 
clandestine radio messages designating a rendezvous, the name of the contact boat, the specific 
cargo to be transferred, and other details” (Willoughby 1964:108). These communications were 
done in code and were generally undetected with the exception of when they interfered with 
other radio operations. Even after investigations into the interference resulted in the findings of 
unlicensed radio station transmissions little could be done. This was due to “The Radio Division 
of the Department of Commerce, … charged with the supervision of radio communications in 
the United States, could do little about these unlicensed transmitters, as it was limited to the
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 United States, could do little about these unlicensed transmitters, as it was limited to inspecting 
only licensed stations, and its investigators had no police authority” (Mowry 2012:2). After this 
problem started to come to light more and more frequently suspicions began about their 
connection to rum-running activity: 
Comdr. Charles S. Root at Coast Guard Headquarters, the officer then most concerned 
with such matters, felt that these unlicensed stations were connected with smuggling 
operations. Aside from the fact that the rummies were known to be using radio, there was 
little to go on. From time to time, Coast Guard radiomen had copied radio signals which 
they believed were transmitted by the rum runners (Willoughby 1964:109). 
 
Root (Figure 9) began to investigate these previously intercepted messages from possible 
rumrunners and set to work on deciphering their codes. Root asked the United States Navy for 
help in these efforts, a request which the Navy promptly obliged. However, when the Navy’s 
efforts in code breaking resulted in a successful operation against a rumrunner, the Navy opted 
out of helping Root, given that it “could not lawfully handle work of this nature” (Director of 
Naval Communications 1931). It was then suggested by the Navy that the Coast Guard might 
benefit from its own cryptology unit, the formation of which Commander Root promptly set into 
motion. 
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Figure 9. A rare photo of United States Coast Guard Commander Charles Root (Photo 
Courtesy of the United States Coast Guard, Washington, D.C, 1900s). 
 
 Root’s first step in the formation of a Coast Guard cryptology unit was in the formation 
of what Root referred to as Radio New York, which was set up with the help of Robert J. 
Iversen, who was an employee of the New York Times Radio Station. The purpose of Radio New 
York was to establish an “intercept site in New York City” (Mowry 2012:3). This site monitored 
both rum-running communications at sea and discovered the locations of unlicensed radio 
stations along the coast (Figure 10).  Root spent several months dealing with considerable red 
tape in getting Iverson and a crew consisting of two Canadian resident aliens into the Coast 
Guard, along with obtaining equipment for intercepting rumrunner communications. Eventually, 
Radio New York intercepted its first communication from a rumrunner (Mowry 2012:4-7): 
Radio New York’s first rum-runner intercept was apparently accomplished on 4 
December (1925) with the copy of a message from the SS Copeman to its principals in 
Cardiff, Wales, announcing its arrival date. The Copeman had been formerly known as 
the SS Avontown and had, under that name, been a rumrunner. As a Result of this 
intercept, the Coast Guard was able to estimate the ship’s location at 40⁰N 73⁰W. Root 
immediately ordered Iversen to monitor its frequency continuously and forward intercept 
by Special Delivery since her cipher was readable and analysis could lead to the 
discovery of her shore connection (Mowry 2012:7). 
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After this initial intercept, Radio New York began successfully monitoring rumrunner traffic 
ranging from onshore communications to those coming from outside of territorial waters on Rum 
Row. International stations were also monitored by the Coast Guard, including the circuit 
between New York and London that led to the copying of a transmission from the ill-fated I’m 
Alone in December (Flemming 1998). Communications from other countries were targeted for 
monitoring, including “stations on St. Pierre et Miquelon (off the southern coast of 
Newfoundland), which had both radio and cable communications and was a major source of 
liquor” (Mowry 2012:7).  
 
Figure  10. A wireless radio set used to communicate from the an unlicensed radio station 
on shore to rumrunners at sea on display at the Fisheries Museum of the Atlantic in 
Lunenburg, Nova Scotia (Photo by author, 2014). 
 
 Once it became known that the Coast Guard possibly had the ability to intercept radio 
transmissions the rumrunners began to change their techniques and acquire better equipment 
(Figure 11). “New communications developments by the rumrunners or the Coast Guard always 
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engendered new means of combating them; just as in war new weapons bring about new 
countermeasures” (Willoughby 1964:109). Once the crime syndicates became involved in 1925, 
the rumrunners also had the means to buy the best equipment and to place well trained 
individuals who knew how to use said equipment on the payroll. As a result “The liquor 
smuggler in 1927 had at his command, both on ship and ashore, the newly developed and very 
efficient high frequency radio communication equipment” (Willoughby 1964:109). The onshore 
stations were widespread, along with being well equipped: 
The illicit stations were equipped with the best and newest radio apparatus, capable of 
working with stations in foreign countries, and manned with first-class, experienced 
operators. English and French traffic, both plaintext and encrypted, was transmitted; and 
radio procedure was primarily amateur and commercial, although… the occasional use of 
naval procedure indicated that some of the illicit operators were ex-Navy or ex-Coast 
Guard (Mowry 2012:11). 
 
Subterfuge in regards to intelligence became the policy of both sides of the Rum War conflict. 
As a result of the need for secrecy for both the rumrunners avoiding the Coast Guard and the 
Coast Guard needing to communicate their locations and orders, encryption became 
commonplace within the communications of both sides. 
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Figure 11. Various examples of radio equipment used by the syndicates to listen to 
transmissions from shore to Reo II, a late Prohibition Era Nova Scotia based rumrunner. 
On display at the Fisheries Museum of the Atlantic (Photo by author, 2014). 
 
 Originally, the Coast Guard utilized the same codes as the United States Navy. However, 
increased usage during the Rum War caused the Navy to become concerned that overexposure 
could lead to their codes being broken. This forced the Coast Guard to develop its own system of 
codes: 
Lt. Frank M. Meals, who had been both a telegraph operator and a radioman with a good 
background of commercial and Government communications, was given the task, along 
with his other duties, of preparing a suitable code for use strictly by the Coast Guard. He 
was on familiar ground, for he had previously worked on ciphers and solutions. He 
teamed up with Mr. Robert T. Brown, a civilian employee at Headquarters, and sought 
the friendly help and criticism of the Army’s Chief Cryptanalyst, Maj. William F. 
Friedman, and his wife…Meals and Brown finally produced the Coast Guard’s first 
official code book (Willoughby 1964:108). 
 
With the establishment of a cryptology all its own, the Coast Guard then turned its efforts 
towards solving the ciphers of the rumrunners.  
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 Very little effort had been directed towards cryptanalysis of the ciphers believed to be 
under use by the rumrunners. Most of it had been done by individuals or groups within agencies 
that had been pulled in for consultation by the Coast Guard. “By spring of 1927, an enormous 
number of encrypted messages had accumulated in the Coast Guard Intelligence Division” 
(Mowry 2012:14). Former Commander Charles Root, who now had achieved rank of Captain 
within the Coast Guard, organized the effort and obtained the equipment for radio intercept 
stations in both Florida and California. Elizebeth S. Friedman, who had previously worked on 
establishing the Coast Guard’s first code book, was tasked with the backlog of materials that had 
been previously intercepted (Figure 12). Friedman took two months to dispense with the backlog 
and get the Coast Guard up to date. The amount of materials being intercepted by the Coast 
Guard increased exponentially with intercept stations in place, leading to the founding of an 
official intelligence service within the Treasury Department dedicated to the illegal encrypted 
messages. These were all actions that “would put the enforcement agencies (Coast Guard, 
Customs, and Justice) in immediate possession of specific knowledge of the smugglers (which) 
as a consequence… would be able to launch seizure actions or initiate preventive measures while 
the smuggling operations were still in the planning stage” (Mowry 2012:16-17). 
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Figure 12. Elizebeth and William Friedman in 1957 (Courtesy of George C. Marshall 
Library, Lexington, VA). 
 
 With radio intercept stations in place, along with a dedicated intelligence service 
involved with the cryptanalysis of messages used by rumrunners, it was now possible for the 
Coast Guard to gain intelligence on those involved in the illicit activity. The problem now for 
enforcement agencies was to develop a way for practical enforcement with the information the 
Coast Guard was receiving. While some rumrunner messages contained information such as 
contact points and ships involved, many simply contained details such as meeting times. These 
latter messages were useless in terms of intercepting those involved in the rum trade without 
other details. It was decided that the best way to combat the situation was to develop technology 
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that could detect onshore radio stations and their high frequencies. Unfortunately, “Until the very 
early 1930s there were no adequate high frequency direction finders for locating rummy ships 
and stations (and) about the only means of judging the probable location of a radio station was 
the strength of its signal” (Willoughby 1964:110). This meant Coast Guard destroyers cruising 
aimlessly about the seas while hoping that a signal, which could be terminated at any moment 
became stronger or weaker based on the determination of the radio crew’s skills. These methods 
were unacceptable by the Coast Guard and “the problem of locating outlaw radio stations ashore 
(had) created a need for light, compact, highly portable yet sensitive and serviceable high 
frequency radio direction finding equipment” (Solt 1930:1). 
 Lieutenant Frank Meals, who also had worked on the Coast Guard’s first code book 
(Figure 13), was tapped for the task of creating suitable equipment for high frequency direction 
finding. Lieutenant Meals was given command over the Coast Guard “six bitter” ( the nickname 
given to the 75 foot patrol boats designed for Prohibition duty due to their size) CG-210 in order 
to conduct tests on intercepting radio transmissions while at sea. “This patrol boat had been fitted 
out ostensibly to conduct certain experimental radio work, but actually the purpose was to 
intercept and record certain radio traffic for the purpose of detecting and identifying persons, 
ships and stations engaged in illicit operations” (Willoughby 1964:109). Initial results were 
painfully slow and, eventually, Radio Electrician Clyde T. Solt was assigned to CG-210 to help 
with the experiments. This was because “Solt was an expert on radio direction finders (which 
resulted) in (the development of suitable equipment)” (Willoughby 1964:110). 
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Figure 13. United States Coast Guard Lieutenant Frank M. Meals who helped create the 
Coast Guard’s first codebook (Courtesy of United States Coast Guard, Washington, D.C., 
1920s). 
 
 The Type X high frequency radio finding equipment (Figure 14) was a result of the 
efforts of Meals and Solt during their time aboard CG-210. The Type X was very successful in 
efforts to locate shore radio stations along with “good radio bearings on offshore rum vessels” 
(Willoughby 1964:110). Major William F. Friedman added to the work of Meals and Solt 
onboard CG-210. Major Friedman devised a system for the quick deciphering of codes being 
used by the rumrunners that were operating around New York Harbor. Friedman then read the 
decoded operating orders back to the rum ships, which had the effect of halting delivery of all 
alcohol along the New York coastline for several days (Kahn 1967:806). 
46 
 
  
Figure 14. The Type X Radio Finder (Courtesy of the United States Coast Guard, 
Washington, D.C., 1924). 
The success that the crew of CG-210 had brought about was unprecedented in the Rum 
War. Lieutenant Commander Frank J. Gorman, who was head of the Coast Guard intelligence 
unit, made the comment that the “resulting confusion to this group of rum ships was more than 
all the efforts of the destroyer force and the other units combined have been able to effect in 
months” (Kahn 1967:806). The development of a more portable Type X to be used ashore added 
to their success: 
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A small portable direction finder, concealed in a conventional leather suitcase, could be 
used in public without revealing its nature. When the clandestine signal was received at 
right angles to the sides of the suitcase, it was emitted by a small concealed loudspeaker 
unit. Many radio sets in houses or buildings were detected by this means (Willoughby 
1964:110). 
 
The Coast Guard successfully used these suitcase sized devices (Figure 15) to locate and shut 
down, in the New York area, six unlicensed radio stations (Commandant, US Coast Guard 1930).  
 
Figure 15. The suitcase sized radio direction finder (Mowry 2012:Frontispiece). 
 Once the value of gathering communications intelligence was realized, the Coast Guard 
outfitted three more six-bitters with high frequency intercept and directional finding equipment 
similar to that which was on CG-210 (Figure 16). These were CG-131, CG-214, and CG-141 
(Commandant, US Coast Guard 1930). Needing personnel as well “the Unit was staffed with 
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eleven officers and 45 enlisted men, performing rudimentary cryptanalysis and providing time-
sensitive (communications intelligence)-derived information to the anti-smuggling fleet” 
(Unidentified Correspondent: LCDR Gorman). The onboard crew tasked with the interception 
and immediate cryptanalysis resulted in more immediate results with regards to stopping the 
illicit activity associated with intercepted communications.   
 
Figure 16. United States Coast Guard “Six Bitters” of the same build as CG-210 on patrol 
(Courtesy of the United States Coast Guard, Washington D.C., 1920s). 
 
 This represented a change in methodology for what the Coast Guard and other 
organizations were using the intercepted messages for in the Rum War. Originally, the Coast 
Guard put the focus on the location and interception of illegal onshore radio stations. While these 
operations were successful in finding the onshore stations, convicting the individuals responsible 
for the illicit transmissions in any meaningful manner proved difficult, even with the cooperation 
of several government agencies: 
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Convictions for violation of the radio laws could often be obtained with relative ease. 
Convictions for conspiracy, however, were difficult and involved, and required revelation 
of methods used by enforcement agencies which would have defeated the whole 
program. Efforts to build up conspiracy cases involved the offshore vessels, the radioman 
ashore, their “higher ups,” and information gained through interception of the radio 
messages. Proof was required of an agreement between individuals to commit an illegal 
act, and of an overt act such as actual smuggling or the use of an illegal radio station 
(Willoughby 1964:112). 
 
Violations of radio laws simply meant fines, which the rumrunners could dismiss by paying 
them. Convictions of conspiracy resulted in higher fines and possible prison sentences for the 
individual convicted of the crime, but the gains of removing an easily replaceable radio operator 
and station did not outweigh the loss of revealing the current system of communications 
intelligence being utilized by the Coast Guard: 
The campaign against the unlawful shore radio stations had produced such meager 
punitive results that it was decided to leave the stations alone and let them transmit. With 
cryptanalysis being carried on successfully, the best results were obtained by gaining 
usable information from the rummies themselves, and the unit concentrated on that. 
Thereafter, the Coast Guard had better success by taking bearings on the offshore vessels, 
picketing them, and making seizures on the basis of intercepted information (Willoughby 
1964:113). 
 
This was the standard methodology for using communications intelligence by the Coast Guard 
against the rumrunners for the remainder of the conflict (Figure 17). 
 
Figure 17. Coast Guard agent listening in to radio traffic (Mowry 2012:5).  
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 Even with the methodology of the interception of intelligence remaining consistent, the 
Coast Guard still invested time and finances into the further development of more precise high 
frequency direction finders. Radio Electrician C. T. Solt was heavily involved in this process: 
Subject equipment is the result of more than three years intensive research and 
development work for the purpose of providing satisfactory high frequency radio 
direction finders, suitable for use on small vessels and capable of consistently reliable 
results in obtaining bearings on smugglers of contraband and other illegal radio stations. 
The performance of this equipment during the tests described herein was highly 
satisfactory and indicates that the actual worth and practicability of the equipment is well 
worth the effort and money expended incident to its creation (Solt 1932:1). 
 
 Solt’s report included future uses for the recently developed high frequency direction finder: 
In order that the mass of valuable data obtained as a result of this work might be used to 
the greatest advantage by those concerned, the writer is compiling a text describing in 
detail the characteristics, limitations, and application of the various types of high 
frequency radio direction finding equipment which, in the event of war, could be used to 
excellent advantage against an enemy in locating secret radio stations which would most 
certainly exist for espionage purposes (Solt 1932:2). 
 
Solt also incorporated the obvious benefits of such equipment in combating smuggling which, in 
the years this equipment had been developed, had led to the knowledge that “many rummies 
dealt not only in liquor, but also in Swiss watches, French perfume, contraceptives, firearms, and 
ammunition for Cuban revolutionists, and aliens” (Willoughby 1964:113). The techniques and 
equipment were proven to have further effect after the repeal of prohibition in 1933. An example 
was when “In 1936 the Coast Guard had begun to cooperate with the Bureaus of Customs and 
Narcotics to suppress the smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States” (Mowry 2012:29).  
 A big part of what this equipment and methodology was capable of accomplishing was 
put into effect with the outbreak of the Second World War in Europe. The United States Coast 
Guard was initially tasked with keeping the country’s neutrality. Its expected duties included 
“the sealing of communications equipment on all belligerent vessels entering U. S. ports and the 
prevention of communications concerning shipping of the movement of belligerent ships, 
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communications which would compromise the neutrality of the United States” (Mowry 
2012:30). Some of these communications were similar to the ciphers used by rumrunners in the 
years prior. When decrypted, the communications turned out to be those of Axis agents. The 
methods and equipment developed and practiced during the Rum War came to be a large part of 
the Coast Guard’s contribution during the Second World War (Farley 1942). 
 The use of radio by the rumrunners, and the resulting development of radio finding 
equipment by the United States Coast Guard, is a great example of Hegel’s dialectic at work. 
Before Prohibition the Coast Guard had no reason to develop or employ radio direction finders. 
With the steady use of radio by rumrunners it became a near necessity to get a lock on the 
location of a rumrunner ship in very large bodies of water. This task was nearly impossible 
through only visual methods. Thus, through the conflict of the Prohibition Era, developments in 
radio and radio directional finding equipment took place. 
  
  
CHAPTER FOUR: THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANDREW HIGGINS 
Details on developments in ship innovations during the Prohibition Era are not easily 
come by due to a number of reasons (as discussed in Chapter Six: Further Studies).  Many new 
technologies came about from individuals wanting to keep their companies open during the hard 
times of recession and the Great Depression. One such person was Andrew Higgins (Figure 18). 
Higgins was a New Orleans native who built boats mainly for the lumber exportation and 
importation business out of Louisiana (Strahan 1994:15). The boats designed by Higgins 
Industries had design roots in American Prohibition and greatly inspired the later designs of 
Higgins’ company during the Second World War. Two of these designs, the PT Boat and the 
Higgins Boat, are great examples of technology developed due to economic factors and the 
conflict between rumrunners and the United States Coast Guard during Prohibition. In this 
chapter, each of these vessels will be discussed in length including the history of these 
innovations and their uses. 
 
Figure 18. Andrew Jackson Higgins onboard a Higgins Industries constructed PT Boat 
(Strahan 1994:Frontispiece). 
 
 53 
 
The PT Boat 
Prohibition may not have been directly responsible for the development of a vessel that 
could serve as a torpedo platform, but it did play a role in the effect and superiority that 
American Patrol Torpedo, or PT Boats, had during World War II (Bulkley 2003:489-509). This 
section will show how the economics of Prohibition, as well as the need for fast craft on the part 
of the rumrunners, led to the Higgins-made PT Boat. Included in this section is also a brief 
history that displays the importance of the torpedo in modern naval warfare, specifically a craft 
design needed to deliver a torpedo payload that was developed alongside the ordnance. 
The development of large armored vessels at the turn of the 20
th
 century resulted in the 
need for weapons capable of destroying them. The self-propelled torpedo was a weapon capable 
of destroying a ship that had been in one form of development or another since the 19
th
 century. 
The torpedo was showcased during the Russo-Japanese War, which has been called “the first 
great war of the 20
th
 century,” when both Imperial and Japanese navies launched nearly 300 self 
propelled torpedoes (Olender 2010:233). Despite their heavy use, the weapons only sank one 
battleship, two armored cruisers, and two destroyers. Most other ships were sunk during the 
conflict by gunfire, mines, and scuttling (Olender 2010:234-236). Despite this relatively small 
percentage of successful uses of the weapons relative to the 80 or so vessels that were sunk in 
action during the conflict, the torpedo was recognized as having potential during the battle of 
Tsushima in May of 1905. After silencing the Russian flagship Knyaz Suvorov with 12 inch 
guns, Admiral Togo ordered torpedo boat destroyers to finish the battleship so that the Japanese 
fleet could pursue the fleeing Russian Navy. After the Japanese launched a total of twenty-one 
torpedoes, the pre-dreadnaught Russian vessel was damaged below the waterline enough to sink 
it, killing over 900 crew members in the process (Olender 2010:225-235). 
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 The Japanese ships that sank the Russian flagship were considered full size destroyers. 
Most ships of this time were constructed with deep draft hulls to allow enough structure to carry 
the large guns that were the popular forms of ordnance during this period in warfare. With the 
recognition of what the torpedo could do against even the largest ships, as shown during the 
sinking of Knyaz Suvorov, many navies began looking into arming smaller and faster motor 
boats with the developing technology. Italy was the first nation to combine the technology of 
torpedoes and motor boats shortly before the outbreak of World War One: 
They were of a ten-ton design and were 52 feet long. By 1916, the Italian boats were 
from 50 to 69 feet in length, carried from two to four small torpedoes and one or two 
machine guns. In general, they were capable of a speed of about 33 knots and had little 
freeboard. To enable them to approach their objective in silence, they were equipped with 
two electric motors furnished with storage batteries. These motor torpedo anti-submarine 
boats, MAS as the Italians called them, were used for attacking surface vessels and 
submarines, for coastal reconnaissance, escorting seaplanes and mine sweeping (Electric 
Boat Company 2010:3). 
 
The Italians continued development of fast vessels capable of launching torpedoes through 
World War One. These vessels proved their worth in terms of harassing Austria’s maritime trade 
and communications, even during their first action: 
…in the form of a raid on the night of June 6th, 1916, on the Bay of Durazzo, carried out 
by two MAS’s from a Brindisi base. The boats were supported by destroyers which 
towed them most of the way. In the bay, they sighted a large steamer, the Lukrum, at 
anchor. One torpedo was fired resulting in the sinking of that vessel. During that night the 
Austrians did not discover the presence of the MAS and thus they were uncertain as to 
the method by which the Lukrum was destroyed (Electric Boat Company 2010:3). 
 
The Italians continued their success using the MAS (Figure 19) against the Austrians through 
further raids in the Adriatic, with “the most notable successes being the sinking of the light 
cruiser Wien at Trieste on December 9, 1917, and the sinking of the battleship Szent István in the 
Straits of Otranto on June 8, 1918” (Bulkley 2003:40). 
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Figure 19. The Italian Navy Motorbarca Anti-Sommergibile or MAS. This particular 
drawing is of MAS 15, which along with MAS 21 attacked and sank Szent István, one of the 
largest battleships in the Austro-Hungarian fleet as it lay at anchor near Premuda Island, 
Croatia. (Art Courtesy of Joseph Hinds, 2014). 
 
 The British paralleled the success of the Italians in terms of developing more modernized 
small craft capable of delivering a torpedo payload. These were built by Thornycroft in 1915 and 
known as coastal motor boats, or CMB’s (Figure 20), of which Thornycroft made two different 
models. One was forty feet long and capable of speeds up to 33.5 knots. The other was a 55-
footer. There were plans made for a seventy foot vessel had the war continued past the fall of 
1919. These boats functioned not only as vessels capable of making torpedo attacks, but also 
were capable of laying mines, smokescreens, and the rescuing of downed pilots during the war 
(Bulkley 2003:40). 
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Figure 20. A 55 foot Thornycroft Coastal Motor Boat (Winchester 1936:529). 
 
 America, with its advantage of geographical isolation, had very little need for fast, short 
ranged ships capable of delivering torpedoes during the First World War. Torpedo armed motor 
boats were mainly being used to strike against maritime shipping in Europe and the only thing 
coming close enough to American shores for such boats to target was the occasional German U-
boat. However, due to inquiries as to their possible uses, the American Navy still experimented 
with the technology of torpedo motor boats between the First and Second World Wars (Electric 
Boat Company 2010:44). 
 Various efforts were made by the Navy Department between 1915 and 1917 to acquire or 
test torpedo motor boats, none of which were deemed acceptable (Buckley 2003:41). In 1920, 
the American Navy purchased from the Britain two Thornycroft CMB’s; a 55-footer and a 40-
footer. The American Navy still did not put plans for a torpedo motor boat into production 
despite the usage of these craft until 1930 and 1934, respectively. 
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 The opposite could be said in regards to foreign production of torpedo motor boats. The 
demand in Europe for the fast boats was consistently high and the technology was also always 
improving. Eventually, the Royal Navy settled on one type of CMB. These were the Vosper 70-
foot boats that were the mainstay torpedo boat of the Royal Navy and were developed by Hubert 
Scott-Paine and the British Powerboat Company. These boats even saw production in the United 
States as part of the lend-lease program during the early stages of World War II, even though 
they were never picked up for production by the United States Navy (Buckley 2003:42). 
 Foreign interests in the design of torpedo motor boats continued to increase the interests 
of the United States. In 1936, this led to the Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, 
Rear Admiral Emory S. Land, writing a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations in regards to 
possible uses of such craft: 
Developments since the War of the motor-torpedo-boat type, then known as Coastal 
Motor Boats, have been continuous and marked in most European Navies… The results 
being obtained in the foreign services are such as to indicate vessels of considerable 
military effectiveness for the defense of local areas, are being built the possibilities of 
which should not be allowed to go unexplored in our service. It is, of course, recognized 
that the general strategic situation in this country is entirely different from that in Europe, 
so that motor torpedo boats could not in all probability be used offensively by us. It 
appears very probable, however, that the type might very well be used to release for 
offensive service ships otherwise unavoidably assigned to guard important geographic 
points such as an advance base itself. If the department concurs this Bureau suggests the 
inauguration of an experimental program for such boats and will endeavor to have 
included in its appropriations for experimental work, funds for the construction of two 
boats each year, preferably one by contract on designs of private naval architects and one 
from Departmental designs (Tredinnick and Bennett 1946:420-14). 
 
After these recommendations being given to the Secretary of the Navy, they were eventually 
approved by the General Board with the agreement that the geographic isolationism of the 
United States decreased the importance of such vessels. However, it was viewed that “future 
situations can occur under which it would be possible for such small craft to be used on directly 
58 
 
offensive missions- as is no doubt contemplated in certain foreign navies” (Tredinnick and 
Bennett 1946:420-14, 407). 
 In order to determine a design which could be the most effective, the Navy publicly 
invited ship designers to engage in a contest and submit their designs for several different types 
of vessels. Among the vessel types requested were plans for a large motor torpedo boat, with the 
criteria for design consisting of “an overall length of 70 feet, not to exceed 80 feet; trial speed of 
40 knots; minimum radius of 275 miles at top speed and 550 miles at cruising speed (along with) 
Armament (that was) to include at least two 21-inch torpedoes, four depth charges, and two .50-
caliber machineguns” (Buckley 2003:44). When the final results were released in March of 1939, 
it was announced that the winners of the 70-foot class were sailboat builders Sparkman and 
Stephens. This design, designated by the Navy to be Patrol Torpedo or “PT,” was then contracted 
out to various other naval architectural companies for improvements on the design as well as 
production.  
 The first company to receive a contract for the Sparkman and Stephens design was 
Higgins Industry. Andrew Higgins accomplished this by turning in the lowest bid, seeing “the 
chance to build the 81-foot Sparkman and Stephens model as the opportunity that he needed” to 
establish ties to future Navy contracts (Strahan 1994:42). Higgins, who was happy to be awarded 
the contract, set to looking over the designs of the craft. After recognizing flaws in the design 
and reporting them even before building the craft, Higgins was told by the Navy Department to 
follow the designs without modifications. Tests of the first craft built by Higgins Industries 
resulted in “the objectionable characteristics and performance we (Higgins Industry) had 
prophesized” (Navy Department Price Adjustment Board 1943:49). Never one to let bureaucracy 
stop innovation and good craftsmanship, Higgins promptly set about building a modified version 
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of the Sparkman and Stephens design. This craft was built utilizing the resources and capital of 
Higgins and “when it was delivered in February 1941, it was a Higgins design rather than a 
modified Sparkman and Stephens, and was accepted enthusiastically by operating personnel, 
many of whom considered it superior to any previous type” (Bulkley 2003: 49). 
 Higgins was able to accomplish the redesign of the Sparkman and Stephens while still 
designing several other craft that Higgins hoped might help to acquire Navy contracts at the 
same time, including the later discussed Eureka design, due to Higgins Industries’ familiarity 
with the type of craft they were contracted to build with the PT boat. This knowledge was a 
direct result of the company’s involvement with rumrunners during Prohibition. In the words of 
Andrew Higgins: 
During the Prohibition Era we (Higgins Industries) had opportunities of having a free 
hand for the design of fast boats, boats that would be strong and seaworthy, yet as light as 
possible to obtain maximum speed, the boats at the same time to have weight carrying 
capacity and ability, the type of boat that would have a long cruising radius and at the 
same time be of such shallow draft as to operate in shoal waters or make entrances into 
estuaries infrequently navigated (Navy Department Price Adjustment Board 1943:46). 
 
In as close to a confession as even someone as brash as Andrew Higgins dared to allow 
themselves when presenting before the authority of a branch of the United States military, 
Higgins was admitting to the low design costs, quick production turnaround, and high quality of 
the PT boat designed by Higgins Industries being a direct result of the company’s collective 
experiences in designing craft for rum-running during the Prohibition Era.  
 After further testing and reviews, the United States Navy made an effort at the 
standardization of the PT boat (Figure 21). Most of the standardizations were pulled from ideas 
gleamed from a series of tests known as the Plywood Derby, consisting of testing PT designs 
through a 190-mile full throttle sea trial. The standardizations were “the boats were to be 
powered by three Packard engines equipped with silencing mufflers (and) their length was not to 
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be less than seventy-five feet or over eighty-two feet” (Bulkley 2003:92). During the Plywood 
Derby Higgins Industries had entered the 76-foot PT 70, which finished with the second highest 
average speed behind Elco’s PT 21. Both boats were considered to be even despite the speed 
difference due to the “77-foot Elcos (running) the roughest” during the trials (Bulkley 2003:55). 
 
Figure 21. The Elco built 77-foot PT 34. PT 34 was assigned to MTB Squadron 3 and was 
one of six PT boats that were in service when the United States entered the Second World 
War in December of 1941. (Art Courtesy of Joseph Hinds, 2014). 
 
 Higgins Industries eventually was allowed to submit another bid to build PT boats for the 
Navy. Higgins built 24 boats, while another company named Huckins manufactured 8. However, 
with both of these companies being smaller and with the United States officially entering World 
War II, Elco was also awarded a contract due to their ability for large-scale production for 36 
boats. Once given official contracts, both Elco and Higgins changed their initial designs for the 
production of PT boats in interesting ways, according to Ted Sprague, one of Higgins Industries 
top engineers: 
We went to a boat that wasn’t quite so beamy, was stronger, was steeper, and heavier. 
Elco went to a boat that was more like that 76-footer [of Higgins] than their previous 
boat. You’d swear somebody must have gone in there and taken the lines off the 
[Higgins] boat which isn’t that hard to do when you know how and used that for their 
design. Of course who would ever admit it. Though I think Mr. Higgins suspected it. I 
went to Elco’s yard when we took PT 71 and 72 up to Melville. We stopped at Bayonne 
and I went through Elco’s yard there. It sure looked to me like our 76-foot hull. At any 
rate that’s all fair. We went one way [with the design] and they went the other (Strahan  
1994:92). 
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Whether this was simply Sprague’s opinion or fact, Elco put their newly-designed PT boats into 
service in 1942, followed shortly by Higgins Industries’ PT boats a few months later (Figure 22). 
Huckins produced their PTs into service last and, eventually, lost out on their contract due to the 
standardization and quality of both Elco’s and Higgins’ PT boats. 
 
Figure 22. PT Boats being assembled at Higgins' City Park Plant (Strahan 1994:123). 
 The PT boat had a very illustrious career filling many roles that the United States Navy 
required of it during World War II. By the end of the war in 1945, there were 30 squadrons of PT 
boats in commission. The versatility of this boat showed in the numerous operations that were 
asked of it: 
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PT’s met the Tokyo Express at Guadalcanal. They cut enemy barge supply lines in the 
upper Solomons and along the New Guinea coast. They torpedoed German cargo lighters 
in the Mediterranean, and overcame E-boats in gunnery duels in the English Channel. 
They contributed to the rout of Japanese task forces in the Battle of Surigao Strait, and 
successfully countered vicious Kamikaze attacks at Mindoro. Under cover of darkness 
they freely landed agents, scouts, and reconnaissance parties throughout the Solomons, 
New Guinea, and the Philippines, and on the coast of France and Italy. PT’s were in more 
frequent contact with the enemy, and at closer range, than any other type of surface craft. 
They specialized in close-range, close-to-shore attack, and everywhere demonstrated that 
they could hurt the enemy with proportionately small damage to themselves (Bulkley 
2003:2). 
 
In a reflection of the ideas of the dialectic, this superior design in vessel construction was a direct 
result of the experiences gained from the conflict between rumrunners and the United States 
Coast Guard. Higgins industries was prepared to design a boat meeting the specifications listed 
by the Navy for the PT’s due to their prior involvement with constructing craft for use 
specifically during Prohibition, which evolved to the design used for the Navy’s standardized PT 
boat during World War II (Figure 23).  
 
Figure 23. The Higgins built 78-footer PT 84 (Bulkley 2003:57).  
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The Higgins Boat 
The transporting of large numbers of personnel directly to shore has been a problem since 
vessels were created large enough to be able to deliver great numbers of people. Issues of having 
such a craft arise, such as the need for a shallow draft and a means to propel the vessel through 
the shallow water (Krulak 1984:92). Even the launches of sailing ships had a hard time getting 
personnel to shore through unfavorable conditions such as oceanic waves and river currents. 
Modern motor boats even suffer from problems of grounding in shallow waters due to prop 
placement or even from the shape of their hull. The condition of the shore itself could compound 
the problem of getting personnel ashore, resulting in the need for a dock to transcend past tough 
terrain. As can be imagined, all of these problems become even more strenuous and difficult 
during times of war in any era (Krulak 1984:73). Despite advances in technology, infantry 
remains the backbone of the military force of any nation. Getting these personnel to where they 
are needed most, especially in terms of amphibious landings, has never been an easy process. 
Doing it in the era of concepts such as advanced artillery, combat air support, and other notions 
of modern warfare simply increases the difficulty of the operation (Alexander 2006:198). The 
problem of having the means of landing modern infantry directly onto a hostile shoreline in the 
face of adversity as safely and efficiently as possible in the early onset of the modern era was 
solved by a creation of New Orleans resident Andrew Higgins (Krulak 1984:98-99).  The design 
of the vessel able to accomplish this task was the Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel (LCVP), 
also referred to as the Higgins Boat.  
The design process of the LCVP stems from the Prohibition Era, as will be shown later in 
this chapter. However, to fully understand the importance of such a ship it is necessary to take a 
look at its place in history. While the LCVP’s utilization during World War II makes it easy to 
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summarize it simply as a “ship as an element in a military…system,” its purpose represents more 
than that (Muckelroy 1978:216). Doing this requires “going beyond functional and systems 
analyses to achieve fuller explanations of the roles of ships in a broader social context (that) 
necessitates invoking the ship as a symbol” (Adams 2013:22). In order to view the LCVP 
properly as the symbol it is means looking at the mentality that it helped to change by exploring 
the history of the landing craft that came before it.  
 The operation of landing troops via ships onto a hostile shore goes back to ancient times. 
In the Iliad, Homer speaks of Greek troops landing onshore after crossing the Aegean Sea in 
their war with Troy around 1200 BC. Several hundred years after that in 490 BC, Persian 
invaders used the concept of amphibious warfare against the Greeks during the landings in the 
Bay of Marathon (Holland 2005:168). Marine landings became less common during the 
Medieval era. Norse raiders out of Northern Europe were perhaps some of the best at applying 
the concept of landing troops ashore during this time period (Graham-Campbell 2013:20-21).  
 While some of the amphibious landings during ancient times were made in the face of 
opposition, none of them were done while facing down modern enemy artillery. The invention 
and application of gunpowder into combat is considered to be the moment that ushered in the 
concept of early modern warfare. This era, known as gunpowder warfare, also corresponds with 
the Age of Sail. Ships, along with the cannon they carried, began to evolve together into more 
formidable weapons of war (Archer et al. 2002:217-219). In response to this mobile threat, 
nations built constructs such as octagonal forts and coastal batteries to prevent ports of strategic 
importance from the dangers of a sea invasion.  
 The British Empire began to show its dominance in naval warfare during this time period. 
Due to the geographic isolation of the British Isles in relation to other European countries, 
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Britain could afford to invest more heavily into its navy than other nations.  The amount of 
personnel that was available with the necessity of a smaller army to defend the islands and the 
readily available number of trained seamen due to life on an island were a large part of these 
investments (Lambert 2005:126-127). These resources, along with some of the most brilliant and 
inventive naval tacticians of the day, resulted in a very effective navy and doctrine. This included 
concepts such as improved health awareness and ships being re-victualled at sea (Macdonald 
2006). Navigation at sea also become more of a science than an art, greatly increasing the 
effectiveness of a navy when planning alongside the more predictable timeframe of troops 
moving on land.  
 Britain’s high quality naval doctrine soon resulted in the concept that once again troops 
could make land assaults from the water despite the advances in military ordinance. This was put 
into practice by William Pitt during the Seven Years War in a series of offensives made in the 
Americas during the years 1757-1759. It was Pitt’s objective during this time to stretch French 
and Canadian resources to a breaking point by advancing along lakes and inland waterways from 
the Atlantic Seaboard toward the Ohio. Pitt also used these assaults to test how much of an 
advantage Britain had in “superior sea-based logistics and larger forces” (Lambert, 2005:119). 
While not every effort made by Pitt during this time was successful, the belief stood that the 
landings of troops ashore could still be accomplished and British tactics of amphibious warfare 
continued to develop. 
 One of the developments that came about during this time was specialist flat-bottom 
boats to be developed and used for landing large numbers of troops and cargo ashore with open-
beach embarkation methods (Foster 1998:14). The development of the flat-bottomed boats 
produced two types of beach landing craft that were, essentially, the same with differences in 
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dimensions. The larger of the two, which was 36 feet in length, 10 feet 2 inches in the beam and 
with a crew of twenty oarsmen, was ideal for cargo transportation but could carry up to sixty 
personnel. The other design was slightly smaller at 30 feet and required a crew of sixteen 
oarsmen. This smaller design could carry forty personnel (Harding 1989:37). These boats, along 
with constantly evolving strategies to make amphibious warfare more successful, continued 
developing even after the end of the Age of Sail.  
 The onset of the Industrial Age saw its share of amphibious warfare. During the 
American Civil War, Union troops made several landings on Confederate shores (Anderson 
1962:11-21). However, no specialized craft were used. The opposite held true during the War of 
the Pacific in 1879. Several times, Chilean forces used amphibious techniques to get their troops 
ashore. In November of 1879, Chilean forces successfully took the city of Pisagua from a 
combination of Peruvian and Bolivian defenders.  This was accomplished through a combination 
of artillery support from Navy ships bombarding the forces while open oared vessels landed 
troops and sappers to clear the beach for future waves of infantry. The unfortunate side of this 
was that due to the shape of the vessels, troops were forced to disembark in waist deep water and 
walk to shore while under fire. Later during the war in 1881, Chilean forces, having learned from 
prior efforts, utilized special purpose built flat-bottomed boats in their actions to take Lima. 
These thirty six boats were capable of delivering troops right up to the beach and “able to land 
three thousand men and twelve guns in a single wave” (Farcau 2000:159). 
 The First World War also saw its share of amphibious operations. One of the areas of the 
war where amphibious warfare saw the most developments was during the Battle of Gallipoli in 
1915. The Gallipoli Peninsula belonged to what was then the Ottoman Empire and formed the 
northern edge of the Dardanelles, which was a straight used by the Russian Empire. Britain and 
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France invaded the peninsula in an attempt to keep those straights open so their Russian allies 
could continue to provide naval support and supplies. This resulted in an invasion which is 
considered to be the first modern amphibious landing, consisting of the combined forces of 
ground, sea, and air efforts (Aspinall-Oglander 1992:25-30). 
 Troops were landed during the initial operations in Gallipoli via unmodified rowboats 
which, as can be imagined, were very vulnerable to fire from the shore. Work began on 
developing purpose-built landing craft, but until their production some ideas were put into place. 
One concept was the modification of River Clyde, a collier that was used in the landing at Cape 
Helles. Openings were cut on the ship and gangways created to allow troops to move from the 
hull and on to a bridge of smaller boats. Sandbags were stacked to create a protective barrier for 
eleven machine guns that were staffed by Royal Air Navy Service troops on the bow boiler plate 
(Alexander 1997:10-12). 
 On the morning of April 25, 1915, British aircraft from Ark Royal began to bombard the 
shoreline and Ottoman defenses. They also reported back targets via radio and light signals for 
naval bombardment. The first troops to arrive on shore were from the 1
st
 Battalion, a company of 
Royal Dubliner Fusiliers. This company arrived via vessels that were towed or rowed onto shore. 
These vessels came under heavy fire from the shore almost immediately and casualties were 
high. Eventually River Clyde arrived with the remainder of the invasion force and grounded 
before the tows that had carried the 1
st
 Battalion ashore. Once the modified collier was in place, 
the plan called for the flat-bottomed steam hopper Argyll to beach in front of River Clyde to act 
as a floating bridge (Figure 24). Argyll ended up beaching itself parallel to the beach and was no 
help in transporting troops ashore. In response to this, the captain of River Clyde, Commander 
Edward Unwin, placed three lighters between the troop carrying collier and the shore as an 
68 
 
attempt to bridge the ship to the mainland. This allowed some platoons to get to shore, but many 
were victims to the shore defenses or from simply drowning after falling off the makeshift bridge 
and into the water with heavy equipment. The efforts were so poor in taking the shore that, 
eventually, further actions were postponed until dark, leaving River Clyde as a target for shore 
defenses. Eventually, through further attempts, the beach was taken and River Clyde became a 
source of fresh water and a field dressing station throughout the rest of the invasion (Hart 
2011:1-22, 157).  
 
Figure 24. River Clyde beached at Gallipoli (Courtesy of the National Army Museum, 
London, England, 1915). 
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The cost in lives to take the beach at Gallipoli set the British to designing purpose-built 
craft for the carrying of troops from ship to shore. These craft had a spoon-shaped bow for taking 
beaches, along with a drop down front ramp to allow for the quick disembarkment of troops, and 
bulletproof sides. These boats were known as ‘X’ lighters, but soon were nicknamed by soldiers 
as “beetles.” The lighters were based on London barges and had similar dimensions of 105 feet 
six inches length, 21 feet in beam, and a draught of seven feet six inches (Figure 25). They were 
capable of self propulsion of five to seven knots and could carry five hundred troops (Friedman 
2014:214).  
The ‘X’ Lighters first saw action towards the end of the Gallipoli campaign at the 
Landing at Sulva Bay in August of 1915. A fleet of “Beetles” were to be under the command of 
Commander Edwin Unwin, formerly of River Clyde. Unwin was tasked with getting IX Corps to 
the shore of Sulva Bay. This operation met with disaster virtually from the start, with the 
destroyers deploying the force unloading the boats in the wrong location, resulting in the 
groundings of ‘X’ Lighters in the shoals, forcing the troops within to wade to the beach in water 
up to their necks. The landing was total chaos amplified by the fact that the operation was done 
at night (Nevinson 1919:392-340). Despite the failure of the Landing at Sulva Bay, the concept 
of the ‘X’ Lighters as purpose-built craft for the landing of troops during amphibious operations 
proved to be a useful one (Friedman 2014:214). 
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Figure 25. An ‘X’ Lighter bringing troops ashore at Mudros, Lemnos in 1915 (Courtesy of 
Library of Congress, Washinton, D.C.). 
 
Unfortunately, the failures during the actions at Gallipoli left many believing that 
amphibious assaults in the modern age were considered impossible in the face of shoreline 
defenses. This belief only grew during the time period between the First and Second World Wars 
and it: 
Emphasized that amphibious assaults must be essentially like the innumerable failed 
frontal assaults on the Western Front 1914-1918, because inherently an amphibious 
assault must be a head on attack and not a flanking maneuver. An amphibious assault 
would be yet more hopeless than attacks on the old Western Front because of the 
necessity to attack out of the water, with soldiers’ movement impeded and even minor 
wounds likely to result in death by drowning (Krause and Phillips 2005:393-396). 
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This paradigm of thought had a direct effect on the planning of Operation Overlord: the plan to 
invade German occupied Normandy in 1944. Further enhancing the effect of “Gallipoli 
syndrome” was that: 
The only amphibious assaults of that time in World War II that had contended against 
serious resistance on the beaches were Salerno in Italy on 9 September and Tarawa in the 
Gilbert Islands in the Pacific on 20 November 1943; both had brushed uncomfortably 
close to failure. Neither Salerno nor Tarawa had presented defenses nearly so formidable 
as those with which the Germans would guard the northwest coast of France by the 
Spring of 1944 (Krause and Phillips 2005:396). 
 
Nevertheless Operation Overlord became an undertaking of necessity with the Allies needing to 
get a foothold somewhere within “Fortress Europe” if there was to be any success against the 
Germans. As a result of this Overlord took a considerable amount of planning.  
 A large portion of Operation Overlord consisted of landing troops onto the beaches of 
Normandy in the face of heavy adversity. Carrying out an amphibious assault as efficiently and 
safely as possible in the age of modern warfare, as noted previously, posed quite a few problems. 
The largest of these issues is having a vessel capable of dropping infantry and vehicles directly 
onto the beach without leaving them in deep waters or stranding the vessel itself. Thankfully, the 
United States Marine Corps already had such a vessel in the LCVP (Krulak 1984:98-99).  This 
vessel was capable of carrying large numbers of infantry, vehicles, or supplies and depositing 
them directly onto a hostile beach. The Higgins boat, which was capable of 12 knots, was 36 feet 
3 inches in length, 10 feet 10 inches in beam, and only had a draft of 3 feet 3 inches aft and 2 feet 
2 inches at the bow (United States Navy 1944). It could hold up to 36 troops and, after depositing 
those on the beach via the boat’s bow ramp, the Higgins boat could then reverse itself off of the 
beach and return to continue its mission goals. However, the design for this vessel did not 
happen overnight. It was the result of ingenuity and the tenacious, hard work of both its designer 
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Andrew Higgins and Higgins Industries that had spanned decades and has its origins deep in 
America’s Prohibition Era.    
Part of the legacy of Andrew Higgins is the sturdy and reliable work boats that Higgins 
and Higgins Industries designed and built. One early example of these kinds of craft is what 
Higgins called the Eureka (Figure 26), which was created out of the necessity and demand of 
companies that worked within the swamps and bayous of Louisiana. These companies were in 
the businesses of the fur trade and oil refining, both lucrative trades in the early 1930s. Their 
needs to reach either their traps or the rich oil deposits found deep within the Louisiana marshes 
inspired Higgins to design a boat capable of traversing over fallen trees, sandbars, and thick 
vegetation. These craft needed to have a shallow draft, be rugged, safe and durable while 
carrying both personnel and equipment through the hazards of Louisiana waterways (Eureka 
News Bulletin 1942:1). After several years of changing designs, the need for such a vessel 
resulted in Higgins Industries’ spoon-billed Eureka, a boat that inspired the design for the 
Higgins boat that performed so famously for World War II amphibious landings. 
 
Figure 26. Early Model Eureka Boat (Strahan 1994:119). 
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However, even the Eureka had a predecessor. Advertised by Higgins as “the homeliest 
but most efficient boat ever built,” the Wonderboat was a full-tunnel stern craft capable of 
navigating the harsh swamps and marshes of Louisiana. The full tunnel system allowed for the 
propeller and shaft to operate with a shallow draft. The only downside was that this system 
created a loss of power due to the aeration of the water around the propeller, an effect known as 
cavitation. Later models of this vessel experimented with a tunnel stern system utilizing only a 
semi-tunnel in an attempt to increase power (Strahan 1994:22). 
The Wonderboat was an achievement in design, which allowed the company that 
produced it an advantage in marketing. Higgins Industries was a small business and was 
constantly in financial difficulties before being awarded contracts shortly before and during 
World War II. Higgins solved this problem through Higgins Industries creation of desirable 
workboats, one of which was the aforementioned Wonderboat. The Wonderboat was purchased 
by the Biological Survey Agency and the Corps of Engineers for their use in undeveloped 
waterways, but those small contracts proved not to be enough to keep the company out of 
financial straits. Higgins needed a larger contract to keep Higgins Industries going (Strahan 
1994:24-27). 
Higgins found this contract by gaining the United States Coast Guard as a customer. 
Higgins approached the Coast Guard in the early 1930s with notions of advertising the 
Wonderboat as a craft capable of patrolling anywhere within the Gulf of Mexico. It was found 
that“After testing the craft, … (the United States Coast Guard) agreed that the Higgins boat 
would give it a decisive advantage over the increasing number of rumrunners operating in the 
coastal waters” (Strahan 1994:26). Higgins was never completely satisfied with the Wonderboat 
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and knew that constantly evolving it would take considerable funds. These funds were acquired 
by selling to both sides of the conflict during the Prohibition Era: 
With the Coast Guard as a customer, Higgins approached the smugglers. He suggested 
that now that the Coast Guard had new, faster patrol boats they too needed a better craft. 
He assured them that he could design and produce a boat capable of keeping the rum 
flowing. Later, Higgins returned to the Coast Guard, recommending that it replace the 
Wonderboat with a newer, faster model (Strahan 1994:26). 
 
This worked well for Higgins Industries. The cost of the Wonderboat seemed too steep due to the 
limited budgets of most companies at the time. By selling to both the Coast Guard with the 
United States Treasury as its backer and to the rumrunners that were making considerable profits 
during Prohibition, Higgins was able to keep the doors to Higgins Industries open and further 
develop concepts such as the ones utilized by the Wonderboat. In keeping with the ideas of the 
dialectic furthering innovation through conflict as well as economic factors present in 
Prohibition, Higgins Industries was able to develop ways to land personnel on shore in a highly 
successful manner. 
One of the main unique features of Higgins’ Wonderboat development was the design of 
the bow. Rather than utilizing a standard pointed bow, the Wonderboat showcased a curved piece 
of pine shaped by hand that formed a solid block known as a head-log. This head-log included 
holes that were drilled into it that were filled by wooden pegs and loaded with marine glue, 
increasing the strength of the bow. This essentially acted as a bumper for the front of the boat, 
allowing it to traverse difficult waterways and obstacles in the water with ease (Eureka News 
Bulletin 1942: 2). 
The change in the bow of the Wonderboat also resulted in a difference in the amount of 
aerated water under the front of the craft. The head-log essentially increased the amount of 
aerated water under the bow and reduced the amount of friction against the craft while it was 
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moving in the water. This increased the amount of speed the craft was capable of achieving. It 
also increased the vessel’s ability to turn sharply. This was a plus in regards to amphibious 
operations as well as “Once the craft had retracted itself from the beach and reached deep water, 
its engines could be reversed so it could turn swiftly enough to face the next wave” (Strahan 
1994: 22). This had been a problem in prior craft that were not turned in time and often caught an 
incoming wave while parallel rather than perpendicular to it, which often resulted in capsizing. 
Of course, with a greater amount of aeration caused by the new design in the bow, the 
ever-evolving Wonderboat ran the risk of too much cavitation when this aerated water reached 
the propeller. Solving this problem was the main focus of the designers working to improve the 
Wonderboat. The solution to this issue came about quite by accident. Two metal plates had been 
pulled out of the molding floor of one of the Wonderboats in production. This went unnoticed by 
the foreman on duty and the distortion of the shape of the boat resulted in a reverse curve aft and 
a “V” section at midship. After the ensuing tirade that Higgins threw upon seeing the mistake, he 
still ordered that the boat be completed. Strangely enough, the accident in fabricating caused the 
problem of cavitation to be fixed and increased the speed of the craft to over twenty miles per 
hour. The new shape of the hull caused the aerated water being created by the head-log to be 
forced out while more solid water was brought in midship and over the propeller. Higgins felt the 
name Eureka fit the new design better with the difference in shape than the original Wonderboat 
(Oakes 1944:13). 
The performance of the Eureka was remarkable. Due to its design, it was efficient with 
power and able to travel over objects and through vegetation in waterways for extended periods 
of time. Of course, with such groundbreaking design and innovation Higgins faced doubters: 
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Higgins occasionally had Andrew, Jr. (Higgins’ son) take such doubters out on Lake 
Pontchartrain and through a test course in which a Eureka would jump floating logs, turn 
in its own length while at full speed, and then finish by running up the step-type concrete 
sea wall of the lake (Strahan 1994:24). 
 
For nearly every doubter in its abilities, the Eureka craft had its supporters. Higgins was able to 
sell the craft to Oil companies working all through Mexico, the East Indies, Columbia, and the 
Amazon River (Strahan 1994:24). 
 The United States Marine Corps was included in the group of Eureka supporters. The 
Marine Corps mission was being responsible for the deployment of the concept of an Advanced 
Base force, but they were having trouble moving equipment and personnel onto what were often 
undeveloped beaches. Military exercises in the early 1920s utilizing the “Beetle Boat” only 
further proved the problem: 
That our landing craft had not advanced far beyond what it was during the Revolutionary 
War. It was still a matter of manhandling what could be manhandled over the sides of 
conventional Navy ships’ boats- whose hull design had not changed materially for more 
than forty years- or just doing without until a harbor became available (Krulak 1984:90). 
 
Ship to shore transportation was still a problem within the Marine Corps, thanks to a shortened 
budget and lingering Gallipolli syndrome, and they looked to Andrew Higgins and the Eureka to 
solve it. Higgins, who was already trying to get naval contracts and having to deal with the 
bureaucracy of those processes with the United States Navy, was more than happy to do business 
with the Marines: 
The Marines first saw the Eureka in 1934 and perceived it to be a big step toward what 
they were seeking. They quickly formed a pact with Higgins, an alliance fertilized by 
their mutual impatience with the Navy’s Bureau of Construction and Repair (later Bureau 
of Ships) for what they saw as its dilatory approach to the landing craft problem. Pressure 
generated by that alliance resulted in the Navy’s cautious purchase, in late 1937, of just 
one of Higgins’s boats (Krulak 1984:92). 
 
After tests of the craft, the Navy ordered five more Eureka craft for further testing. These 
performed quite well during the Marine trials they endured during exercises in the Caribbean, 
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warranting the commanding officer of the Marines, Major General Holland M. Smith, to say in 
regards to future amphibious landings “If we had 300 of those boats and the ships to carry them, 
we’d be in business” (Krulak 1984: 94). 
 Ideas of Marine Corps Lieutenant Victor Krulak, gained from witnessing the Japanese 
amphibious assault at the mouth of the Yangtze River in September of 1937 (Figure 27), added 
to the improvements of the Eureka. Here Krulak saw: 
In action, exactly what the Marines had been looking for- sturdy, ramp-bow-type boats 
capable of transporting heavy vehicles and depositing them directly on the beaches 
(Krulak 1984: 90). 
 
 
Figure 27. Japanese landing craft with a ramp-type bow landing troops at the mouth of the 
Yangtze River in 1937 (Krulak 1984:91). 
 
By March of 1941, Krulak found himself, along with Major Linsert of the Equipment Board, in 
the offices of Higgins explaining the need for a redesigned Eureka with the bow ramp similar to 
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the one witnessed by Krulak in China. Higgins not only put the ramp on the Eureka, effectively 
creating the Landing Craft, Personnel (LCP) that was used throughout World War II, but also 
designed a larger version capable of transporting vehicles directly to the same beaches known as 
the Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP) (Krulak 1984:92-95).  
 The LCVP became the workhorse of the United States Marine Corps during the Second 
World War. It saw action at every beach United States Marines took in both the European and 
Pacific theaters. This ingenious craft was the direct evolution from the Eureka design, which, in 
turn stemmed from the concepts developed in the Wonderboat design (Figure 28).  
 
Figure 28. Models of the Eureka, LCP, and LCVP (Photo by author, 2014).  
Without those developments the quality and effectiveness of the LCVP which “contributed more 
to our common victory (in World War II) than any other single piece of equipment” may never 
have came to be (Smith 1949:72). This further reinforces the idea of the LCVP as a symbol. One 
of the concepts behind the United States Marines philosophy is the ability to establish an 
Advanced Base Forward (Krulak 1984:74). This idea, which requires the possibility of an 
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amphibious assault as well as the moving of equipment over various shore terrain that is possibly 
hostile, was seen as impossible because of the events in Gallipolli in 1915. Thanks to Marine 
officers such as Eli Kelley Cole who “had become intensely interested in Gallipolli-what went 
wrong there and why,” amphibious assaults in the modern era started to become realized as a 
possibility again (Krulak 1974:79). The faith in the mission of the Marines as well as the design 
of Higgins Industries led to a shift in mentality when it came to amphibious assaults, all of which 
were centered on the success of the LCVP and what it represents, that: 
Our (The United States Marine Corps) dreams of the true amphibious assault were, until 
then (success of the LCVP during tests), just dreams. Now they had become a reality. For 
the first time there was a reliable way to make tanks, trucks, tractors, artillery, antiaircraft 
weapons, and heavy engineer equipment a part of the beach assault (Krulak 1984:98). 
 
None of this was possible without the shift in mentality due to the LCVP and its history of 
design. 
  
  
CHAPTER FIVE: SMOKE SCREENS 
Utilizing a smoke screen is a military tactic that dates back for hundreds of years. Cutting 
off visuals to troop, vessel, or vehicle movements is beneficial for the concealment of military 
maneuvers (Latimer 2001:71-74). However, early forms of creating a smoke screen were 
dangerous to the troops that used them due to their combustible nature, most especially at sea, 
where fire is always a hazard. All of this changed during American Prohibition when a 
rumrunner named Alonzo Patterson developed a safe method of applying a smoke screen in 
order to evade the Coast Guard. 
 Concepts for the use of smoke screens for military purpose have been around since 
ancient times. Examples include their use by the Greeks during the Peloponnesian War (Latimer 
2001:6-14) and even propositions by Sir Thomas Cochrane of the British Royal Navy in 1812 for 
use as an asphyxiate against the Russians (Cordingly 2007:347).  However, the first documented 
purposeful use of a smoke screen at sea belongs to Captain John Wilkinson of the Navy of the 
Confederate States of America. Captain Wilkinson was in command of the CSS R.E. Lee (Figure 
29), a blockade runner during the American Civil War. Tasked with running supplies to and from 
ports all along the American southeast coastline, Wilkinson deployed numerous techniques of 
subterfuge to avoid the blockade the United States Navy had set in place. During one such 
supply run, R.E. Lee was pursued by USS Iroquois in 1863. Wilkinson successfully used the 
steam engine that propelled R.E. Lee to provide a smoke screen to hide the ship, allowing 
Wilkinson to escape the blockade (Wilkinson 1877:167). This manner of employing a smoke 
screen in order to avoid a blockade is in the same manner as those utilized during Prohibition.  
 81 
 
 
Figure 29. The blockade runner CSS R. E. Lee (Barnes 1911:108). 
 The importance of smoke in naval combat became fully realized during the closing parts 
of World War I. The prime example of successfully deploying a smoke screen in naval combat 
during this time period was during the Battle of Jutland in 1918, which was fought in the waters 
of the North Sea just off Denmark. During this battle, the German fleet had fallen into a trap laid 
by the British. In an attempt to retreat, German vessels created a smoke screen that was so thick 
it deterred any attempt at pursuit and further engagement by the Royal Navy. Even though both 
sides suffered heavy losses, neither country could claim a conclusive victory in the battle (Allen 
1919:399-430; Griffiths 2003:88-89).  
 Until after the First World War, smoke screens were created at sea using the engines of a 
vessel in some manner. Ships during World War I changed the fuel-to-air ratio of their engines to 
create a smoke screen. The unfortunate downside to this method of creating a smoke screen is 
that it is hazardous to the friendly forces whose movements you are trying to obscure due to their 
toxic nature as they are being formed from phosphorous compounds, which could result in 
possible short-term, as well as long-term, health issues when inhaled. Adding to this was the 
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unpredictability of smoke screens created using these techniques due to differences in their 
consistencies and the uncontrollable movements of the smoke.  
 Eventually, the usefulness of smoke screens as applied to modern military efforts became 
internationally recognized, resulting in the funding of research and development from multiple 
countries (Brodie and Brodie 1973:195). Even the United States formed a Chemical Warfare 
Service (CWS) as a section of the Army. Although this was mainly in response to the chemical 
weapons utilized by the Germans during the war, the CWS also researched the application of 
smoke and how it affected certain battlefield scenarios (Butler 1998:7-8). 
 All of the issues of creating a smoke screen at sea that of a non-toxic nature to those who 
deployed it were solved not by those in the military, but by the rumrunners during the 
Prohibition Era of the United States. Alonzo Patterson, who was a native of New Orleans, was 
somewhat of a media darling during this time period. Patterson was a high profile trafficker of 
liquor, who controlled a vast network of methods and materials capable of accomplishing a 
considerable smuggling operation. This methodology ranged from a fleet of ships in operation 
within the Gulf of Mexico to bribed officials throughout Louisiana and the federal levels 
(Jackson 1978:273-277). Patterson was the center of a case utilizing an undercover agent that, at 
the time, was hailed as one of the largest liquor conspiracies ever exposed in the United States 
(Jackson 1978:274-276). Eventually, Patterson was brought to trial and convicted of violation of 
the Volstead Act, which resulted in a prison sentence.  Upon release, Patterson proceeded to 
shoot and kill Harry Sempe, Patterson’s brother-in-law. This happened during an altercation 
while Patterson was trying to reconcile with Mamie Patterson, Alonzo’s estranged wife. No 
charges were ever filed, which was believed to be a result of the control Patterson had on local 
officials within New Orleans. 
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 Patterson, despite colorful run-ins with the law that resulted in eventual incarceration, 
maintained a high degree of success rum-running during Prohibition. Part of this was due to 
Alonzo’s development of a successful formula for creating a thick and reliable smoke screen for 
use by ships in Patterson’s employ hoping to avoid contact with the United States Coast Guard 
(Corpus Christi Caller-Times 1941:34). The effectiveness of Patterson’s smoke screen was later 
recalled by Captain R. M. Sykes of the Coast Guard: 
The one day we thought we had Pat (Patterson) he laid down the screen and literally 
disappeared in smoke. We tried everything we had at the spot where we thought he’d be, 
but didn’t score one hit. I was so damned mad I threw my .45 in the ocean! (Corpus 
Christi Caller-Times 1941:34) 
 
This innovation is a direct result of the conflict transpiring during Prohibition. With the 
knowledge that the Coast Guard relied on visuals to track rumrunners, Patterson developed a 
working smoke screen to obscure vessels in order to evade capture. Alonzo also had made sure 
the formula was non-corrosive as to maintain the structural integrity of vessels under Patterson’s 
employ which insured a favorable economic outcome to his rum-running endeavors. 
Upon the repeal of Prohibition, Patterson ironically took work as a customs agent and 
utilized knowledge of the local waters as a navigator in pursuit of smugglers continuing to bring 
in liquor to avoid taxes. Eventually, Patterson quit this line of work and reopened a nightclub 
previously owned by the smuggler before being incarcerated. Patterson was found in this 
nightclub shortly before the involvement of the United States in World War II. 
 A.J. Higgins, also a New Orleans resident, was conducting trials for the United States 
military at the time Patterson had reopened the nightclub. These trials were mainly 
demonstrations of landings of naval craft for the transportation of troops, something Higgins 
believed might benefit heavily from Patterson’s smoke system. Higgins approached Patterson to 
ascertain his methods only to learn that both Dutch and British governments were after the 
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formula for the smoke screen and that Patterson had forgotten exactly what the formula’s 
ingredients were (Corpus Christi Caller-Times 1941: 34).  
 Patterson proceeded to work on recalling the smoke screen formula with Harold A. 
Levey, who was founder and president of American Products Manufacturing Company, Inc., 
known for its production of “the development and manufacturing of equipment for use in 
manufacturing transparent packaging materials, chiefly plastic sheeting” (White 1967:242). 
Together, Patterson and Levey were able to reproduce both the smoke screen formula and the 
equipment for its deployment. The composition of the invention: 
Contains a smoke producing ingredient such as a combination of a mineral oil 
hydrocarbon and an inorganic salt which will vaporize at a temperature of approximately 
300 F to 750 F or less… and will also have the property of imparting to the smoke screen 
generated by the composition an opacity and density which enables the smoke screen to 
hug the ground or articles which it contacts, and which also increases the longevity of the 
smoke screen (Levey and Patterson 1947). 
 
The results of the smoke screen were also expanded upon further testing: 
The Patterson screen can be spread in any desirable density. (Patterson) can make it so 
thick that men on the same boat can’t see each two feet apart. Addition of certain other 
chemicals makes the smoke blue to match deep water, and green to match the shallow, 
and it is possible to lay a luminous screen which can be used as a marker at night (Corpus 
Christi Caller-Times 1941:34). 
 
The smoke screen chemical composition created by Patterson for use during Prohibition and the 
equipment for its use designed by Levey were adopted for research and experimentation by the 
United States Navy during the opening stages of World War II. Reflecting the economics of 
conflict during an interwar period, shortages in a precious resource such as mineral oil during the 
war resulted in Patterson’s formula being modified, which led to the creation of similar smoke 
formulas that produced some corrosive effects.  
Patterson’s ideas of combining fast boats with smoke screens worked to great success 
during the Second World War. Even naval experts described the Patterson smoke screen as “the 
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most effective and most desirable ever used” (The Corpus Christi Caller-Times 1941:34). When 
used in combination with torpedo boats or by destroyers, the smoke screen allowed for cover 
from aerial bombardment in an otherwise open expanse of water (Figure 30). Even though 
Patterson’s exact formula was not used during the war, the ideas that Alonzo applied during time 
spent as a Prohibition Era rumrunner contributed greatly to the safety of Allied naval operations 
throughout the Pacific theater of war and beyond.  
 
Figure 30. A PT boat lays a smoke screen at Salerno during World War II (Bulkley 
2003:294). 
  
  
CHAPTER SIX: FURTHER STUDIES 
 Researching the technologies that helped to come about during the early part of the 
twentieth century has its share of difficulties. Furthering this is the concept that the rumrunners, 
who were major contributors to the conflict, were breaking United States law. While the 
individuals involved usually made no secret about their involvement with smuggling booze onto 
the coastline late at night, they did not keep written records on their actions. Once prohibition 
was repealed, many of those involved in rum-running went back to their ordinary lives, and 
many of those refused to talk about it because it had been the one time in their entire lives that 
they had broken the law. Rumrunners had a code of silence that persisted among them and those 
they had contact with add to the secrecy. As a former rumrunner said to Everett Allen: 
They would rather forget than remember, they will protect the others, because they 
expect the others to protect them, and they don’t want their second wives and their 
grandchildren to know where the family money came from (Allen 1965: xvi-xvii). 
 
The United States Coast Guard is the other side of this conflict. While some of the events that 
transpired during the Coast Guard’s enforcement of prohibition, such as the taking over of rum-
running vessels and court cases involving rumrunners, are well documented, the records 
regarding many aspects of the vessels are not detailed. This is surprising, since many vessels 
seized during Prohibition for rum-running were utilized by the Coast Guard due to their speed 
and other modifications to apprehend other boats in violation of the 18
th
 Amendment. However, 
this utilization of seized vessels to improve their technology was more of a direct result of a lack 
of funding along with the immediate need for technical advantages capable of achieving desired 
results. The United States Coast Guard’s main mission has always been saving lives at sea. Rum-
running vessels were not designed with this in mind; in fact, one could say the opposite with 
many of them being designed to be as fast as possible while also being cheaply manufactured. 
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The utilization of captured rum-running vessels to apprehend other rumrunners was more a 
matter of convenience and economics in an attempt by the Coast Guard to be successful at their 
new mission during Prohibition while circumventing bureaucracy and a limited budget. 
Nevertheless, despite those involved with the conflict keeping detailed accounts of action at sea 
during the Rum War, descriptions of vessels seem to be practically nonexistent.  
 The matter of sources complicates the issues of research even further. With little to no 
written records, most of what can be gathered about rumrunners was collected as a result of 
interviews. With most of the individuals involved in rum-running either deceased or elderly, 
many details involving their methods are now lost. The questions being asked by the interviewer 
increase the loss in information in regards to the subject. Many historians interviewing 
rumrunners asked questions simply to get stories involving rum-running, not the details of the 
craft utilized by rumrunners (Croft and Meister 1984, Fultz and Meister 1984). Some details do 
leak through into interviews, such as use of wireless communication (Croft and Meister, Harold 
Crouse Interview 1984) or descriptions of the dimensions of the vessels (Croft and Meister, Capt. 
Amos Crouse Interview 1984).  
 A good example of lost technology during this era comes from an interview with a 
rumrunner: 
There was a fellow in New Bedford who was a tool and die maker. He had a shop in his 
backyard as a hobby and he wouldn’t bother with regular jobs, but he would take in one 
that was a real puzzler. He could turn stainless steel that you would swear was mirror-
plated. So what we wanted was two engines driving to one gear box and a shaft from the 
gearbox to the propeller, so that you could run either engine or singly or both together. 
We asked him if he could do it and he said, “Come back and see me in a week” (Allen 
1965:176). 
 
This crafter in New Bedford completed this task, creating a system of gear boxes that could run 
four liberty V-12 engines on two propellers, resulting in what the rumrunner claims was easily a 
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speed of over 30 knots. Years later, in the early 1940s, the rumrunner being interviewed came 
across a member of the Coast Guard that recognized the rumrunner from their days during 
Prohibition. Apparently, the boat with the gear boxes had been seized by the Coast Guard, and 
the Coast Guard officer had told the rumrunner in regards to the gear boxes that they “took them 
all apart and the government tried for three-four years to duplicate them, but they have never yet 
made one work” (Allen 1965:177). This shows a considerable technological development that 
came about during Prohibition, but has no basis with any historical record other than the 
interview with Everett Allen. Increasing the difficulty in tracking records brought to light by 
Allen is the belief that: 
In the cases of people whom I have interviewed, I have concealed identities because 
otherwise there would have been no interview and since this (Allen’s book) is, in essence, 
a history, it seemed to me that what they had to offer was worth more than giving the 
public a name that would mean nothing to most (Allen 1965: xvi). 
 
In regards to the vessel with the gear box, Allen also states that it was “installed on the 
rumrunner Maybe, which evidently was seized by the government at some point” (Allen 1965: 
177). It could be assumed that Maybe was most likely seized by the Coast Guard, but the only 
vessel on record that corresponds with anything close to this name is May B, which was utilized 
by the Coast Guard under the designation CG-998. As another example of a lack of detailed 
records in regards to seized vessels, the Coast Guard simply states that May B was used and then 
later burned (Willoughby 1964:168). There is no mention of a gear box or the efforts by anyone 
to reproduce the technology. 
 Word of mouth can often be misleading when it comes to acts of a criminal nature and 
sometimes word in print can be as well. United States Marine Corps Lieutenant General Victor 
H. Krulak said in regards to Andrew Higgins and the Eureka design that “In 1924 Higgins had 
designed a powerful shallow draft thirty-six-foot boat with a novel underwater hull, for use by 
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rum-runners in the Mississippi Delta during prohibition” (Krulak 1984:92). Higgins biographer 
Jerry Strahan has disputed this claim made by Krulak, stating that the connotations suggested by 
Krulak lead to the belief that Higgins designed the Eureka strictly for the illegal importation of 
alcohol during Prohibition. This simply is not true and has been vouched for through Strahan’s 
interviews with Ted Sprague, who was Higgins’ chief PT Boat designer, as well as Richard 
McDerby, who was the chief instructor of Higgins’ landing boat school, and Graham Haddock, 
one of Higgins key landing boat designers (Jerry Strahan  July 11, 2014, pers. comm..). As 
shown in the chapter of this thesis entitled “The Contributions of Andrew Higgins,” A.J. Higgins 
was involved in Prohibition, but the Eureka design did not stem from the strict purpose of simply 
creating a boat for use by rumrunners, as Krulak suggests. 
 Higgins is not the only individual responsible for technological innovations during 
prohibition to have attained a certain mythical status. The former rumrunner and smoke screen 
designer Alonzo Patterson, although lesser known than Higgins, also received a certain 
legendary status. Even in the early 1940s, Patterson was being compared to a “modern glamour 
gal or a snake-dipped all-American pigskin-toter” due to the number of headlines Patterson 
received during Prohibition (The Corpus Christi Caller-Times 1941:34). The infamous Patterson 
Case, which involved one of the first ever uses of an undercover agent to expose what many 
believe was one of the largest liquor conspiracies ever exposed in the United States with Alonzo 
Patterson at the head of the organization, added fame to Patterson (New York Times 1925:273-
77). While this thesis ties Patterson’s contributions to more than just Prohibition, what remains 
unclear is Patterson’s involvement in stepped hull design. After being pressed by several 
governments to make public the formula of Patterson’s smoke screen, Alonzo applied for a 
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patent for the smoke screen composition on May 2, 1942. On May 4, 1942, Alonzo Patterson and 
Hugh C. Ganter applied for a patent in boat design, which was for: 
The present invention relates to a boat construction and more particularly to a novel hull 
and step construction particularly effective in shallow draft boats of the hydroplane type 
(Ganter and Patterson 1946).  
 
This design in a boat hull, with its shallow draft and stepped hull, results in a greater overall 
speed and effectiveness of the craft. This development is interesting because often the 
development of the stepped hull design is credited to Reverend Ramus of Sussex England in 
1872. However, the steam power plants of the day could not propel a vessel to the speeds needed 
to take advantage of the design that utilized pontoons and various planing surfaces in tandem 
(Figure 31). Following this are the patents applied for by William Henry Fauber in 1907 and 
1908 for a multiple stepped hydroplane (Fauber 1909, 1910). Fauber soon left for Europe after 
being unable to generate interest within the United States.  
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Figure 32. William Fauber’s design for a hydroplane or planning type hull in 1907 (Fauber 
1909). 
 
Fauber’s design is followed by the one patented by A.P. Brush in 1932 which allows for a 
“constant planing angle regardless of the speed” (Brush 1932). This design is close to the modern 
representation of the planing hull. A decade after the Brush hull is the design of Alonzo 
Patterson (Figure 32). This design allows for a shallower draft than previous step hull designs. 
This was typical of someone operating within the bayous and waterways of Louisiana, the same 
areas Patterson’s alcohol smuggling operation worked during Prohibition. Given the timing of 
both the patent applications for the hull and the smoke screen, it is by no means a great leap to 
assume that Patterson’s stepped shallow draft hull could have been designed and utilized in 
operations that took place during the Prohibition Era. However, while Patterson’s introduction of 
the smoke screen design made newspaper headlines, the patent for the hull design did not, so it is 
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unclear as to when this technological development came to be or its involvement, if any, with 
Prohibition.  
 
Figure 32. The Patterson step hull design. Its patent was applied for in 1942 just two days 
after Patterson also filed to patent a smoke screen formula and apparatus (Ganter and 
Patterson 1946). 
 
 Other Examples of technology that was possibly lost or its roots remain unspoken of 
comes from other individuals involved in Prohibition. Boat designer and former rumrunner Bill 
McCoy, in memoirs, speaks of a couple of vessels that never made public record: 
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Of the craft that outwitted the government armada during the last days of Rum Row the 
most successful were the “fresh fish” boats. Two of these were built in utter secrecy in an 
old shed on Long Island. Their success and efficiency is attested by the fact that the 
government never found out anything about them. These boats were 60 feet long by 12 
wide and equipped with two Liberty motors which gave them a speed of 35 knots empty 
and 25 laden. Their novelty and the secret of their great success lay in the fact that their 
holds were divided by watertight bulk heads into five compartments, each with a capacity 
of seventy-five cases and each having a trapdoor in its bottom. Hence the “fresh fish” 
nickname. If they had gone out after fish instead of liquor, they could have brought their 
catches still alive to market (Van de Water 2007:211). 
 
There are even reports of the use of submarines to smuggle liquor into the United States during 
Prohibition. After requesting the use of aerial photography from the Fairchild Aerial Camera 
Corporation, the Coast Guard produced a picture of “two subsurface craft, each approximately 
100 feet in length, transiting the Hudson River” (Ensign 2001:34). Even though it has never been 
officially proven that these vessels were being used to transport liquor, this stands as possibly 
either a case of misdirection or another loss of technology that was involved during Prohibition, 
one that has been revived during the current era in the form of the Narco submarine that is 
utilized to smuggle drugs into the United States (Ramirez and Bunker 2014, Figure 33). 
 
Figure 33. Possible rum-running submarines in the Hudson River (Courtesy of the United 
States Coast Guard, Washington, D.C., 1924). 
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These are just a few examples of misdirection and lost information within the study of 
America’s Age of Prohibition. Even with those issues in regards to studying this timeframe of 
American History, the technological developments that came about during this era are still highly 
relevant and apparent, making it worthy of further study while also reinforcing concepts of 
innovation being spurred through conflict and economic need.  
 
 
Figure 34. The lines of a typical and mass produced Canadian rumrunner. In this case Reo 
II (Courtesy of the Fisheries Museum of the Atlantic, Lunenburg, Nova Scotia). 
 
  
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION 
National prohibition in America lasted from 1920 to 1934 (Figure 35). This time period 
challenged many American institutions, from religion and politics to international relations, and 
affected each American differently. Prohibition helped to usher in an age of organized crime that 
is still romanticized in current times. It also helped the Federal Bureau of Investigation become 
the organization it is today, for better or worse in regards to the privacy of the individual. Many 
people lost their lives during Prohibition, oftentimes in violent ways. Despite the negative 
connotations involved with America’s Era of Prohibition, the conflict that erupted between 
government officials and those who opposed Prohibition resulted in major changes and 
developments in technology, many of which helped propel America and its allies to victory 
during the Second World War and on to more evolved technologies used today. 
 
Figure 35. A celebration of Repeal in Chicago, 1934 (Courtesy of John J. Binder). 
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 Prohibition also forged government organizations into states recognizable in the modern 
era. The need to enforce the 3-mile limit and to curb the importation of booze illegally into the 
United States via waterways forced more pressures on the fledgling United States Coast Guard to 
perform its duties. After a string of early unsuccessful efforts to combat the ever-rising tide of 
rum-running, the Coast Guard began to receive funding appropriate to its responsibilities. This 
resulted not only in more personnel and craft for the Coast Guard to utilize, but also in 
departmentalization of areas such as cryptography and intelligence. These departments not only 
functioned to help apprehend rumrunners, but also defended the American coast against actions 
involving Axis forces, and, today, against smugglers and other enemies of the United States and 
its policies. The standardization and expansion of the United States Coast Guard into the 
internationally known organization it is currently was related to its experiences fighting the 
rumrunners.  
 The conflict between the United States Coast Guard and rumrunners has often been 
referred to as “the Rum War.” With war being defined as “an organized and often prolonged 
conflict that is carried out by states or non-state actors,” this moniker is certainly warranted. 
Oftentimes, the importance of the Rum War gets played down due to the modern media’s take on 
the era along with how ingrained the consumption of alcohol has become with facets of 
American culture. Adding to this are the notions that the violence that happened during that time 
period either happened at sea, such as in the case of the I’m Alone (Fleming 1998, Figure 36), or 
were perpetrated by individuals that have become cultural icons, such as Al Capone. Regardless, 
the Rum War had all the makings of a war with comparisons that can be drawn to the American 
Civil War due to the conflict oftentimes being fought between not only residents of the same 
nation, but between neighbors. It even draws parallels to the modern war on drugs and the war 
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on terror with the rumrunners being non-uniformed opposition facing portions of the United 
States military branches. War inherently breeds competition and the conflict within exposes 
necessities.  It has been said that necessity is the mother of invention, and the Rum War, 
particularly the parts of it fought at sea, reinforces that adage. 
 
Figure 36. The Canadian rumrunner I’m Alone. In 1929 this schooner became the focal 
point of controversy when it was sunk off the coast of Louisiana for prohibition violations 
by United States Coast Guard cutter Dexter. This event resulted in the death of one of I’m 
Alone’s crew members as well as a settlement case that brought into question everything 
from ownership of I’m Alone to the methods used by the United States Coast Guard in 
determining a vessel’s distance from shore (Courtesy of the Trinity Historical Society 
Archives, Trinity, Newfoundland). 
 
 This thesis contended to ask if marine innovation was spurred by conflict and economic 
factors during the period of Prohibition in the United States. While most certainly organizations 
such as the aforementioned United States Coast Guard and the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
benefited from Prohibition Era economic factors, such as increased budgets, what is less 
apparent at first glance are the marine innovations.  
 As shown in the chapter entitled “Developments in Radio Equipment,” the need for 
clandestine meeting places between rumrunners and shore operations necessitated modern radio 
equipment onboard the Prohibition vessels. These devices, which were uncommon at the time, 
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were expensive and needed trained personnel to operate which further exacerbated the cost of 
their usage. Prohibition made up for the costs of having an onboard radio on a sea going vessel, 
even the smaller ones tasked with retrieving product from Rum Row. The ever-pressing need for 
profit by the crime syndicates involved in rum-running led to more effective use of radios at sea 
until they “could operate with a fair degree of secrecy over great distances with very low power” 
(Willoughby 1964:109). These radio operators consistently had to do their best with what 
equipment was available to them at the time which led to improvements of various degrees 
(Miles 1992:103-108).  
 The means to track down rumrunners by using their own radios was in a constant state of 
development during this time as well. With “radar…unknown…in the 1920s” radio direction 
finders did the job of tracking down rumrunners at sea (Willoughby 1964:109). As also shown in 
the chapter titled “Developments in Radio Equipment” these radio direction finders that were 
developed during Prohibition were used to great success during the early stages of World War II 
to track down Axis spies.  
 The economic factors of Prohibition helped to keep some operations in business as well 
as further their innovations. Higgins Industries found itself having to transfer due to dwindling 
markets from the timber industry into building boats. This change in operations was easily 
facilitated thanks to Higgins’ willingness to play both sides of the Prohibition conflict by selling 
designs to both rumrunners and the United States Coast Guard. Higgins Industries was able to 
keep its doors open and continue to manufacture boats of a design nature never seen before 
thanks to the contracts obtained during the Prohibition Era. The lessons learned while building 
these boats also led to improvements of the PT Boat and the creation of the LCVP (Strahan 
1994:19).  
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 Effective use of the smoke screen at sea also came into a more common use during the 
Prohibition Era. As shown by Alonzo Patterson’s achievements in design, smoke screens that 
were non-corrosive could even be created. These smoke screens were deployed throughout 
World War II by the United States Navy. However, developments in technology such as radar 
and guided missiles have made the smoke screen at sea obsolete by modern standards. 
 There is also potential for future studies to reveal further innovations that were spurred on 
by Prohibition. Most of the topics covered in this thesis are based in the macro level of 
developments, or ones that are more obvious and widespread due to their nature or use during a 
high profile conflict such as World War II. As shown before in the chapter “Further Studies” 
gaining knowledge on developments created by the actions of law breakers that took place 
during a time period nearly a century ago is not the most simplest of tasks. However, there is no 
doubt that through further research developments in ship innovations during this time period can 
be found on both the micro and macro level. These studies could come about through deep 
research in the historic records of shipyards cross-referenced by those ships that remain from the 
Prohibition Era.  
 This thesis concludes that during the Prohibition Era, economic factors that culminated 
into conflict between rumrunners and the United States Coast Guard directly resulted in marine 
technological innovations and confirms that Hegel’s theory of dialectic social transformation 
through stress of conflict also translates to technological change through social conflict.  
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